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CONTENTS

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POLITICAL

GREECE

- Student Elections Ensure ND Supremacy [I VRADYNI, 9 Nov 87] 1

NORWAY

- Progressive Party Stronger in Municipal Governments 2
Meeting Reveals Greater Aggressiveness [Ole Johan Nilsen; AFTENPOSTEN, 20 Oct 87] 2
Hagen Attacks Middle Parties [Thorleif Andreassen; AFTENPOSTEN, 30 Oct 87] 2

SPAIN

- Reported Changes in CESID Leadership: Comments, Speculation 3
June Considered Appropriate Timetable [E. de Diego; YA, 9 Nov 87] 3
Arab, Israeli Negative Reaction [Fernando Rueda; YA, 9 Nov 87] 4
PCE Official Discusses Leadership, Need for New Blood
[Enrique Curiel Interview; TIEMPO, 19 Oct 87] 5
Factions Reported Forming Within Herri Batasuna [Isabel Martinez; TIEMPO, 26 Oct 87] 8

SWEDEN

- Liberal Party Congress Reinforces Social Concerns Image 9
Paper Views Party's Challenges [DAGENS NYHETER, 7 Oct 87] 9
Chairman's Address Blasts Left [Ake Ekdahl; DAGENS NYHETER, 9 Oct 87] 10
A 'Social-Liberal Party' [DAGENS NYHETER, 9 Oct 87] 11
Papers Around Country Comment [DAGENS NYHETER, 10 Oct 87] 12

TURKEY

- Syriac Defections Continue [HURRIYET, 3 Oct 87] 13
Kurdish Patriarch, Former Deputy Describes Loyalties
[Kinyas Kartal Interview; HURRIYET, 4 Oct 87] 13

MILITARY

FRANCE

- Dassault Income Falls, Layoffs Planned [Jean Guisnel; LIBERATION, 18 Sep 87] 20

ITALY

- Law Strengthens Powers of Defense Officials [LA REPUBBLICA, 11/12 Oct 87] 21
Report on Air Force Situation, Prospects [Nico Sgarlato; AVIAZIONE, Apr 87] 21
Aeritalia To Provide China With Avionics, Testing Equipment
[Giovanni Anzidei; IL FIORINO, 15 Oct 87] 22

NORWAY

- Jan Mayen Island Seen Having Greater Strategic Importance
[Werner Christie; AFTENPOSTEN, 26 Oct 87] 23

PORTUGAL

Need Seen for Discussion, Preparations for F-16 Transfer [Nuno Rogeiro; O DIABO, 10 Nov 87] ...	24
Operational Details on 'Jupiter-87' Air Maneuvers Provided [Manuel Catarino; O DIA, 3 Nov 87]	25
Military Officer Laments Lack of Air Force Resources [DIARIO DE NOTICIAS, 1 Nov 87]	27

SPAIN

Civilian Reportedly To Assume CESID Leadership [Rafael Cid; CAMBIO 16, 26 Oct 87]	28
Helicopter Purchase for Rapid Deployment Force [Fernando Rueda; YA, 2 Nov 87]	29

TURKEY

Law Combines Military Support Foundations [Erdal Saglam; DUNYA, 29 Sep 87]	30
Pirinclik Military Facility Described [Aydin Ozdalga; MILLIYET, 29 Sep 87]	31

GREECE

Student Elections Ensure ND Supremacy

35210025a Athens 1 VRADYNI in Greek 9 Nov 87 p 3

[Article: "MAKI [Student Independent Movement] Opens the Way. Wins over 80 Percent of the Vote in Some Parts of the Country. Students Send a 'Tough' Message"]

[Text] MAKI triumphed in all nomes in the elections for the 15-member student councils in gymnasia and lykeia, not only securing an absolute majority of seats but exceeding by many percentage points its results in last year's elections. It is indicative that MAKI came in first even in areas which PASOK considered "green."

It should be noted that in two areas, Florina and Pieria, MAKI won 88.89 and 82.67 percent respectively, in Lakonia 70 percent, and in Lasithi 53.33 percent.

The MAKI victory was welcomed by ONNED [Youth Organization of New Democracy], while Fr. Armaou, in charge of secondary student affairs for ONNED and member of the Executive Bureau, declared that:

"Greek students, accepting by an overwhelming majority MAKI's positions and proposals to increase spending for education; to improve the material and technical infrastructure; to modernize the educational syllabus and textbooks; to revise Law 1566/85; and to permit the free movement of ideas in schools and a free, democratic student trade-union movement (so that we can glean the best ideas), are now moving on to new struggles after the elections to turn these positions into reality. Because every election is at once the end of one struggle and the beginning of another."

[Boxed item: Totals from the Nomes. According to totals available from all nomes: MAKI wins 58.32 percent; PAMK [Panhellenic Militant Student Movement] takes 18.17; KNE [Greek Communist Youth] 14.01 percent; Rigas 0.31 percent; independents 7.43 percent; misc. 1.05 percent. These totals come from 382 schools and 5,730 seats.]

In Salonica

Salonica. MAKI got over 60 percent in the elections held in the gymnasia and lykeia of Salonica to elect 15-member student councils.

According to a communique from the Student Independent Movement Secretariat in Salonica, MAKI won 487 seats with 60.14 percent of the votes. The pro-Government PAMK won 129 seats with 15.87 percent; KNE students 118 seats and 14.52 percent; Rigas Feraios 2 seats with 0.22 percent; and miscellaneous 63 seats with 7.95 percent of the vote.

In addition, 11 seats were won by independent candidates (1.4 percent).

These are total results from 54 schools in Salonica (810 seats).

After the results were issued, the MAKI Secretariat in Salonica declared that:

"By their vote, the overwhelming majority of students express their unshakable stand in favor of the liberal school of the future.

"The students made MAKI first by a wide margin and with a larger percentage of the vote than ever before.

"We will struggle with all our strength for progress; meritocracy; and the liberal, democratic school which can and must become reality."

Further, the ONNED Coordinating Bureau for the TE's [Local Committees] of the First District of Salonica issued a statement welcoming MAKI's sweeping victory in the elections for the 15-member councils.

The totals by nome are as follows:

Aitolokarnania: Schools 10; MAKI 66.00 percent; PAMK 20.67 percent; KNE 10.67 percent. Argolida: Schools 4; MAKI 56.67 percent; PAMK 26.67 percent; KNE 13.33 percent. Arkadia: Schools 7; MAKI 66.67 percent; PAMK 25.71 percent; KNE 7.62 percent. Arta: Schools 11; MAKI 61.82 percent; PAMK 26.67 percent; KNE 8.48 percent. Attiki: Schools 109; MAKI 53.33 percent; PAMK 17.19 percent; KNE 17.68 percent. Akhaia: Schools 6; MAKI 63.33 percent; PAMK 10.10 percent; KNE 6.67 percent. Grevena: Schools 6; MAKI 51.11 percent; PAMK 27.78 percent; KNE 20.00 percent. Dodekanisos: Schools 4; MAKI 58.33 percent; PAMK 15.00 percent; KNE 00.00 percent. Evros: Schools 4; MAKI 68.33 percent; PAMK 13.33 percent; KNE 11.67 percent. Evvoia: Schools 7; MAKI 53.33 percent; PAMK 24.76 percent; KNE 19.05 percent. Zakynthos: Schools 4; MAKI 46.67 percent; PAMK 30.00 percent; KNE 20.00 percent. Ileia: Schools 13; MAKI 54.36 percent; PAMK 24.62 percent; KNE 11.79 percent. Imathia: Schools 5; MAKI 60.00 percent; PAMK 16.00 percent; KNE 14.67 percent. Irakleio: Schools 7; MAKI 47.62 percent; PAMK 11.43 percent; KNE 16.19 percent. Salonica: Schools 32; MAKI 64.58 percent; PAMK 15.62 percent; KNE 13.12 percent. Ioannina: Schools 9; MAKI 55.56 percent; PAMK 11.85 percent; KNE 20.00 percent. Kavala: Schools 12; MAKI 57.78 percent; PAMK 17.22 percent; KNE 14.44 percent. Karditsa: Schools 6; MAKI 62.22 percent; PAMK 13.43 percent; KNE 16.67 percent. Kerkyra: Schools 4; MAKI 60.00 percent; PAMK 33.43 percent; KNE 6.67 percent. Kilis: Schools 3; MAKI 62.22 percent; PAMK 0.00 percent; KNE 37.78 percent. Kozani: Schools 3; MAKI 57.78 percent; PAMK 28.89 percent; KNE 0.00 percent. Korinthia: Schools 5; MAKI 61.33 percent;

PAMK 17.33 percent; KNE 17.33 percent. Lakonia: Schools 6; MAKI 70.00 percent; PAMK 23.33 percent; KNE 6.67 percent. Larisa: Schools 13; MAKI 56.41 percent; PAMK 20.41 percent; KNE 15.90 percent. Lasithi: Schools 3; MAKI 53.33 percent; PAMK 13.33 percent; KNE 20.00 percent. Magnisia: Schools 6; MAKI 68.89 percent; PAMK 15.56 percent; KNE 12.22 percent. Messinia: Schools 8; MAKI 62.50 percent; PAMK 13.43 percent; KNE 19.17 percent. Pella: Schools 5; MAKI 58.67 percent; PAMK 34.57 percent; KNE 5.33 percent. Pieria: Schools 5; MAKI 82.67 percent; PAMK 13.33 percent; KNE 1.33 percent. Preveza: Schools 14; MAKI 60.95 percent; PAMK 21.43 percent; KNE 17.14 percent. Rethymni: Schools 1; MAKI 67.67 percent; PAMK 20.00 percent; KNE 13.33 percent. Rodopi: Schools 6; MAKI 52.22 percent; PAMK 20.00 percent; KNE 10.00 percent. Serres: Schools 4; MAKI 68.33 percent; PAMK 15.00 percent; KNE 10.00 percent. Trikala: Schools 2; MAKI 56.67 percent; PAMK 13.33 percent; KNE 10.00 percent. Fthiotida: Schools 9; MAKI 62.22 percent; PAMK 19.26 percent; KNE 6.67 percent. Florina: Schools 3; MAKI 88.89 percent; PAMK 6.67 percent; KNE 0.00 percent. Fokida: Schools 3; MAKI 53.33 percent; PAMK 40.00 percent; KNE 4.44 percent. Khalkidiki: Schools 10; MAKI 62.00 percent; PAMK 23.33 percent; KNE 9.33 percent. Krania: Schools 9; MAKI 31.11 percent; PAMK 25.19 percent; KNE 17.04 percent.

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NORWAY

Progressive Party Stronger in Municipal Governments

Meeting Reveals Greater Aggressiveness

36390011b Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
20 Oct 87 p 3

[Article by Ole Johan Nilsen: "Aggressive Progressive Party in 173 Municipalities"]

[Text] The Progressive Party has found its soul and would rather stand alone than renounce its distinctive quality. An aggressive party will be at the starting line in the municipalities over the new year with 756 representatives. At the moment there is no information regarding how many members the Progressive Party has, but it would like to have more. The party is promising major drives in the social sector.

"Following the party's national executive committee meeting this weekend, it was learned that what produced the great return in the form of votes in the election was opposition to the established power politicians," Vice-Chairman Pal Atle Skjervengen said at a press conference in Oslo on Monday. They want to take up the cause of the individual still more strongly, and the strategy for the election campaign in 1989 is to be worked out now in line with this.

"The broadside against the Labor Party's welfare state was another main reason for the Progressive Party's election victory," Skjervengen said. He denied that the denunciations of the refugee policy had been decisive; if so, it was not out of racist motives, he said.

National Insurance Financing

The Progressive Party will submit a new model for national insurance financing. It will both eliminate the health service lines, protect national insurance system rights, and provide pensions to live on.

According to Skjervengen, the party has now found its soul, which lies in the fact that its distinctive quality is being stressed at any cost. "We will act independently and will not hang on anyone else's heels," he said. "Henceforth we would rather stand alone than renounce our distinctive quality."

The Progressive Party will organize itself better, and, as other parties have done, get solidly built county secretariats. The party that is demanding order and perspective in much has no perspective concerning how many members it has—10,000 or 15,000 it was said. They intend to recruit more throughout the fall.

"We are a relatively new party," Skjervengen explained. (The party was formed in 1977, and its predecessor in 1973.)

The party leadership has announced more aggressive city council groups for next year. The Progressive Party now has 756 representatives in 173 municipalities.

Hagen Attacks Middle Parties

36390011b Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
30 Oct 87 p 12

[Article by Thorleif Andreassen: "Hagen Regarding In-Between Parties: 'They Are Trading the Conservative Party for the Labor Party!'"]

[Text] The Progressive Party's Carl I. Hagen lashes out at the in-between parties: "They have traded the Conservative Party as a coalition partner—and chosen the Labor Party!" The powerful salvo was discharged in connection with the submission of the Progressive Party's budget alternative, which, for one thing, involves fewer funds for agriculture, the stripping of subsidies for unprofitable state concerns, and the denationalization of a number of State operations.

On the other hand, Hagen's party supports 500 heart operations a year in foreign countries. The party set aside 32.5 million kroner for this. It has been proposed that 27.5 million kroner be appropriated for orthopedic operations abroad or at Norwegian private health institutions.

The Progressive Party proposes to buy 2000 private hospital and senior citizens' home accommodations next year. The party wants to use several hundred million kroner for this purpose.

Denationalization

A main feature of the Progressive Party's budget proposal is denationalization and debureaucratization. They want to change the Telecommunications Agency and State power plants into corporations, with the aim of a gradual change to the selling of shares to private individuals. In addition, the party wants to make into a separate corporation the part of the Aviation Service that operates airports. The longterm goal here, too, is denationalization.

No to Top Taxes

The Progressive Party says no to top taxes and wants to have reduced appropriations for the culture sector, to cut subsidies for agriculture, for one thing, and to reduce the bureaucracy. The party advocates the further selling of Hydro stock and want to have a cautious start on the selling of Statoil stock. The Progressive Party says a flat no to more transferring of State funds for Syd-Varanger [South Varanger] and the Iron Works. Confirmation

Carl I. Hagen, in a conversation with AFTENPOSTEN, comes out strongly against the Christian People's Party and the Center Party's budget discussions with the government. "What has happened now confirms and makes visible the longterm drift toward the Labor Party that the Center Party has been in for a long time, and which the Christian People's Party followed up under Kjell Magne Bondevik's leadership. The goal is obviously to trade the Conservative Party for the Labor Party as a new coalition partner. This has been a systematic development over several years."

[Question] But Bondevik took part in the attempt to get a new non-socialist government this spring and voted with the Conservative Party, did he not?

Alibi

[Answer] "Yes, he tried to get himself an alibi. But Bondevik knew full well that the Center Party would vote as they did. The special interest parties have with open eyes maneuvered themselves into a situation where together with the Labor Party and Socialist Left Party they will constitute the Storting majority that will govern the country from now on," claims the Progressive Party's chairman.

SPAIN

Reported Changes in CESID Leadership: Comments, Speculation

June Considered Appropriate Timetable
35480029 Madrid YA in Spanish 9 Nov 87 p 2

[Article by E. de Diego]

[Text] Madrid—The administration wants to put a civilian in charge of CESID [Superior Center of Defense Intelligence], thoroughly reliable sources in the Interior Ministry have told YA. The sources ruled out the possibility that this would happen soon or that certain businessmen were already being considered for the post. The informants feel that the change could come after the inauguration of the new CESID building in June.

The building will make the latest advances available to the intelligence service and represents a tool of the first order for enhancing its effectiveness; it is one of the projects on which the current chief of CESID, Gen Alonso Manglano, has placed the most emphasis. Interior Ministry sources note that his replacement by a civilian could come after the building is inaugurated.

The same sources assert that "there is a strong political determination" to have a civilian as head of CESID" and that this "replacement has been in the works for some time." They also indicate that [words missing] this replacement would not [words missing] a reform in the [words missing] of the intelligence services, whose areas of responsibility have never been clearly defined and that have always suffered from a lack of coordination.

The current status of the analysis into a change in the CESID leadership has increased the pressure among various government sectors to proceed with a clarification of areas of responsibility in the sprawling organizational chart of Spain's intelligence services. In addition to CESID, which comes under the Prime Minister's Office and has fundamentally military origins and regulations, there are also the General Headquarters of Information, the Navy Intelligence Service, the Army Information Division, the Air Force Information Service and the Civil Guard Information Service.

Their areas of responsibility have not been defined, and the actual situation is described as "everything for everybody." As a result, at high-level meetings the heads of the various services are very careful not to bring up information that others could use. "This is not the first time that the services are treading on each other."

At times several services investigate the same case and follow the same leads. This is especially true with regard to terrorism. "There is cooperation at the ground floor because there comes a time when efforts should not be scattered, but there is nothing organized about it."

Interior Ministry sources note that all Western countries have a domestic and a foreign intelligence service and that "in no instance are there intelligence services with military discipline like CESID." The proposal from this sector is clear: CESID should be in charge of overseas espionage, within military areas of responsibility in defense and national security, and the General Headquarters of Information should take charge of domestic matters. "In areas of conflict such as Algeria and southern France, where there are members of ETA, there would be no problem because since areas of responsibility would be clear, cooperation would be easier."

Coups and Industrial Espionage

Since he was appointed in May 1981, Manglano has undertaken two internal restructurings in an attempt to tailor the work of "The Enterprise" more closely to Spain as it is today. He first strove to break up the coup movements in the Armed Forces, and in the most recent overhaul, once the attempts to return Spain to the past had been defeated, he put the emphasis on issues such as foreign intelligence and technological security.

In 1984 a royal decree made major changes in hierarchy. CESID was placed directly under the orders of the prime minister, although functionally it still has ties to the Defense Ministry. This enables high-level government authorities to receive and even request intelligence in their area of responsibility. Although it remains military, CESID has thus taken a major step towards "civilization."

Two years ago Manglano ordered another restructuring aimed at updating the service's operations and addressing the new problems with which Spain was faced. An economics and technology division was thus created to combat industrial espionage, which is increasingly common in Spain. This division joined the already existing divisions of foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, domestic intelligence, administration and services, and personnel.

Arab, Israeli Negative Reaction

35480029 Madrid YA in Spanish 9 Nov 87 p 3

[Article by Fernando Rueda]

[Text] Madrid—The intelligence services of various Arab countries and Israel's Mossad have through various channels conveyed their concern to the Spanish Government over the possibility that the director of CESID, Lt Gen Emilio Alonso Manglano, will be replaced sometime in the next few months, as CESID sources have told YA. The reason seems to be the appallingly bad international relations that Spanish secret services had with their foreign "colleagues" until May 1981, when everything began to change after the UCD [Democratic Center Union] administration appointed Manglano.

Lieutenant General Manglano has succeeded in carrying out a sweeping overhaul of Spain's intelligence services. The situation when he took over as a lieutenant colonel was grave, as inefficiency was the norm in the service.

Internationally, Spain took orders from several intelligence services, mainly the CIA, which used CESID for its own ends. This relationship experienced some very grave moments after the attempted coup on 23 February 1981, in which several members of the service were involved and of which U.S. intelligence services were thought to have knowledge.

One of the main missions of the new chief of CESID was to revamp relations with foreign services, which in most cases did as they pleased in Spain. So inefficient was CESID that the Soviet KGB chose Spain as the site of its industrial espionage missions in connection with NATO country armaments and as a base of operations for its "work" in northern Africa. This base, with the Canaries as its epicenter, is still in operation today, although it is faced with many more problems.

Under Manglano, the youngest man who has held the post, foreign activities in Spain began to be more tightly controlled, but relations with the secret services of other countries also became friendlier. One example is Algeria's intelligence services, which early this decade had tense relations with Spain owing to a lack of understanding that no one had bothered to remedy.

The then lieutenant colonel who headed "the enterprise" devoted his initial efforts to "cleaning up" the service on the inside and to opening the door to cooperation with theoretically friendly countries. He thought that his motto "Knowledge to Overcome" should first apply here, because he correctly foresaw that he would be given a meager budget with which to obtain directly the intelligence needed to guarantee national security.

At present, even though the Algerians remain tremendously mistrustful, they have through various channels expressed their concern over the increasingly persistent rumor that Manglano's days at CESID are numbered. They are worried that his replacement, who will in all likelihood be a civilian, will be unable to retain the confidence that they have place in the lieutenant general. On previous occasions they inquired with the Prime Minister's Office about a possible change but came away reassured upon learning of the administration's decision to keep the lieutenant general in his post, which is not that certain this time.

The CESID director was in charge of calming the Algerians when they expressed concern over the freedom of movement that Ben Bella, the opposition leader, enjoyed in southern Spain.

Something very odd is going on in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Arabs are convinced that the Spanish lieutenant general, who never wears his uniform in public, leans more to their cause than to the Jewish cause, which is exactly what the Mossad thinks.

Relations with the Israelis are perhaps CESID's most prosperous at present. Manglano, like his agents, has enormous admiration for the operating style of this service, which provides copious intelligence.

The Mossad has its own branch office in Madrid, and its chief meets weekly with Manglano or one of his aides. In return, CESID maintains a small office in Jerusalem. Oddly enough, Algeria has not agreed to such a quid pro quo and prefers to keep its distance, at least institutionally.

"There's No One Who Can Throw Him Out"

"There's no one who can throw the lieutenant general out." This is the consensus inside CESID and the Armed Forces. Everyone is aware of Manglano's ideal relations with the highest government authorities, who are enormously grateful to him for the work that he has done in "the enterprise." Replacing him now, they feel, would be justified only by the desire to put in a civilian or if the lieutenant general himself asked for another post. "Because," the same sources add, "high-level officials are not replaced when you're pleased with the job they're doing."

The CESID chief reports directly to the king, the prime minister, the deputy prime minister and the defense minister on the matters within his area of responsibility. During such conversations he may have even exerted influence to delay the reunification of the intelligence services of the Interior and Defense ministries, which could have cost him his job.

Defense Ministry sources assert that Narcis Serra personally appoints all his colleagues, but they do not deny that Manglano will not leave his post until he finds another "higher" one. A year ago there was speculation that the lieutenant general might be appointed chief of the Royal Guard, which would not have displeased the director of intelligence. In the end, however, the post went to the then chief of staff of the air force, Lt Gen Jose Santos Peralba.

In any event, his opinion of the person who succeeds him at CESID will be very important. According to the computer-generated composite, the CESID chief must be an intelligence expert, not a politician. "Appointing a civilian in the Civil Guard," they say in Defense, "is not the same as appointing one in the intelligence services."

PCE Official Discusses Leadership, Need for New Blood

35480025b Madrid *TIEMPO* in Spanish
19 Oct 87 pp 17-19

[Interview with Enrique Curiel, deputy secretary general of the Communist Party, by Nativel Preciado; date and place not given]

[Text] Enrique Curiel, deputy secretary general of the Communist Party, is moving away from Gerardo Iglesias, whose virtues he admits, and is cautiously taking aim in connection with the approaching February congress. He has been a PCE militant for almost 20 years, and for a very long time in the shadow of Carrillo. It is the future of the PCE which is at stake. This is the last chance for left-wing recovery, and Curiel, tired of the silence, and with the circumspection characteristic of a good Galician, is subtly suggesting a search for new leaders.

[Question] This PCE proposal that Ceuta and Melilla be surrendered to Morocco will not sit well on the so-called high levels in this country.

[Answer] No one dares to speak about Ceuta and Melilla, but everyone knows that this problem will have to be dealt with soon. Apart from the fact that too much has been made of this proposal, it is my view that it is essential to develop a great consensus among all the political forces.

[Question] Your party, however, opened fire without consulting anyone.

[Answer] I sincerely believe that this subject should be dealt with calmly and smoothly, because it has very important foreign policy implications. It is necessary to pave the way for public discussion.

[Question] Are you not in agreement with the proposal set forth in the political document drafted for the 12th PCE Congress?

[Answer] I will limit myself to stating my opinion, which is that in the end it will be necessary to find a regional solution, negotiated such as to maintain the balance in the Maghreb and control of the Strait. The subjects of Gibraltar, Ceuta and Melilla and the Sahara will have to be negotiated at the same time.

[Question] Are there clashes among the leaders in the PCE?

[Answer] No.

[Question] It is said that you and Gerardo Iglesias are not speaking.

[Answer] That is not true. I believe that in the PCE, following upon major traumas, we have now won the battle of clarity. We have differing opinions, but we must argue them, because in this party, discussion, respect for minority opinions and synthesis are assumed. This is what we have tried to do in recent years, and this is the philosophy which must prevail at the 12th PCE Congress.

[Question] At this congress next February, will an effort be made to find a replacement for Gerardo Iglesias as secretary general?

[Answer] I have never said that. All I maintain is that another stage in the history of the PCE is beginning. And in this stage of moving forward again, what is needed is a new team capable of dealing with the major difficulties we will encounter prior to the elections which will probably be held in 1989.

[Question] And Gerardo Iglesias is not the man for this new stage?

[Answer] Gerardo Iglesias has been a secretary general with the great merit of having headed the party in a very difficult period. And I would be a base individual indeed if I did not recognize this merit. But at the same time, I must say that the situation is changing, and we are entering a new phase.

[Question] Is Iglesias to blame for the failure of the party to consolidate since the departure of Carrillo?

[Answer] No, I do not believe there is any personal responsibility.

[Question] What is happening with the Spanish left wing, which seems to be nonexistent except for the PSOE?

[Answer] The man mainly responsible for this lack is Felipe Gonzalez, who has succeeded in demoralizing the left wing in this country. And I use demoralize in the fullest sense of the term. In other words, he has taken value from the country and has won a kind of ideological battle, following which the left wing was stripped of its content. Since the 10th of June, the PSOE has been suffering, has had nightmares and has been rending its garments, because it cannot understand the electoral results. Now the difficulties are beginning, but they are those most responsible for the fact that the votes went to the left. This government has been eroding the values which won it victory in 1982.

[Question] This left wing did not vote for the PSOE, but it is obvious that it did not vote for the PCE either.

[Answer] This is our problem, and this is what concerns me at present. The million and a half votes the PSOE lost did not go to the United Left. The most dynamic sectors of the left wing have withdrawn because of the absurd policies of some and the incompetence of others. And if

the Communist Party does not succeed in breaking the 5-percent barrier in the coming elections, the leftist experiment in Spain may end very badly, for I am certain that the downward trend of the PSOE will continue. And I am not one of those who want the PSOE to founder, not one of those who think that the worse things are for them, the better they are for us.

[Question] Why hasn't the PCE been capable of recovering?

[Answer] I said on one occasion that the PCE has undergone the harshest, longest and deepest crisis of any international communist party in recent years—a crisis which has lasted 7 years.

[Question] And which is continuing.

[Answer] Well, that is not true. We found ourselves without a policy beginning in 1979, when Suarez won the election and told the Congress of Deputies that the consensus had ended. Then we did not know what to do. We got up in the morning working for unity on the left, and by bedtime we were the democratic opposition, while the PSOE had bypassed us and had become the alternative. Suarez negotiated with the PSOE and we were excluded, and we did not know what to offer the sectors which had supported us since the dictatorship.

[Question] The blame for this is always put on Santiago Carrillo.

[Answer] An individual with as marked a personality as Santiago Carrillo can contribute decisively to such errors, but all the blame does not fall to him. I have spent 20 years with the PCE, practically a lifetime, and I have seen from my experience that errors of this sort cannot be attributed to a single individual. All of us who were in the leadership of the party and were unable to correct the path, to wage a sufficiently effective battle to improve that erroneous policy, are responsible. For the first time I am admitting openly my responsibility, small or great, in that crisis, because I was one of those who kept silent. I have therefore promised myself never to keep silent again, for by doing so I made myself an accomplice in that disaster, that ideological paralysis which made us incapable of offering an attractive alternative to the leftist sector in this country.

[Question] The worst of it is that the communists still have not found a formula which can inspire the left wing.

[Answer] I do not claim to have magic solutions. I have spent months studying the experience of other communist parties in Europe, and I see that neither the Portuguese, nor the Italians, nor the French have been able to benefit from the votes lost by the Social Democrats.

[Question] Can you think of no kind of solution, apart from lamenting the reasons for the collapse of the left wing in Europe?

[Answer] The 12th PCE Congress, which we will hold in February, will be the great occasion for our major relaunching. What we are doing now is the only thing we can do to recover ground in the elections in 1989. We have to address ourselves to an electorate which voted communist in 1977 and 1979 and voted socialist in 1982, and now has withdrawn because it does not want to vote for any party.

[Question] And what will you offer this leftist sector in order to mobilize and inspire it?

[Answer] It is possible to pursue a leftist policy different from that which the government has without making it irrational or radical. Therefore we must, first of all, resolve the communist problem, in other words achieve unity above everything else.

[Question] With Santiago Carrillo as well?

[Answer] With all the communists. After succeeding in a process of relaunching our own party and communist unity, we must bring about the participation of other leftist forces in this project.

[Question] This was what the United Left sought, and it was unable to win over a single additional vote in the elections.

[Answer] We did indeed win some additional votes in the municipal elections. In any case, the United Left came into existence at a time when there was still an image of disagreement among the communists. In this instance, an effort is being made to widen the range of this offer to other leftist social sectors which want to participate. Moreover, the United Left, with its ups and downs, proved to be a valid project. We have ahead of us, until 1989, a very difficult task, but it is necessary to achieve these goals, because otherwise we run the risk that the PCE will become only a marginal and symbolic party. And I do not want to end up with such a party.

[Question] And in such a case, what would you do? Would you go over to the PSOE, like Pilar Brabo, Jose Maria Mohedano and so many others?

[Answer] I will fight to ensure that this does not happen. I had a very difficult experience during the Santiago Carrillo crisis, but then I was younger. Now I am not, and I will try to prevent the PCE from becoming nothing more than an incidental party. And in the event that I do not succeed in this, I will do no more than regret it. However, I have hopes that things will change, because something is moving on the left. Neither Redondo, nor Leguina, nor many of the leaders of the PSOE are saying the same things they did before, and Benegas, Guerra and Gonzalez know this. The key to it is that the PCE must participate in this movement on the left. And to do so, intelligence and a certain skill are needed.

[Question] To achieve this, a good leader capable of inspiring the voters is needed. Do the communists have a leader with charisma?

[Answer] More than a leader, what is needed is a good, cohesive, strong political team with prestige and with leadership capacity, domestically and internationally.

[Question] That is what I am saying—do you have leaders with these characteristics?

[Answer] We have lost many cadres of tremendous value. The majority have gone over to the Socialist Party and are keeping the administration afloat. The list of those in high posts shows an overwhelming majority of former PCE members. It is satisfying to know that our old comrades are governing this country. But we are still left with a new generation of cadres, those between 30 and 35, who are in the mayoral posts and in the trade-union struggle, and who have great political ability.

[Question] Do you plan to draw the future leaders from these sources?

[Answer] It is obvious that they are the future PCE.

[Question] Is there no "dark horse," a kind of Berlinguer who can rescue you from the crisis?

[Answer] Would that we had a Berlinguer! There are none in this party. What we need is a good team.

[Question] I am afraid you need something more if the slogan "They will listen to us" is to become a reality.

[Answer] The political slogan to which you refer served its purpose with regard to the issues which required a clear, harsh confrontation.

[Question] When was your message heard?

[Answer] On the NATO issue, for example. At the time of the referendum, a spectacular resurgence of the left, a revitalization of all of the progressive democratic forces in this country, occurred.

[Question] Yes, but it passed quickly, and no one was able to make use of it.

[Answer] Because we lost the referendum. Had we won it, things would have been very different.

[Question] The fact is you lost.

[Answer] That is true, but the left wing is nonetheless here, and I think that there may be a resurgence at any time. A number of fronts have been developed—the attitude of the trade unions, which are united against the government for the first time; the profound internal

debate which is under way in the PSOE; the new international situation with regard to disarmament. Spain may still play a basic role as a spearhead in the new process of detente.

[Question] It does not seem that the U.S. government will allow Spain to assume the role of a protagonist.

[Answer] Obviously, the Americans want to remain everywhere—not only in Rota or Zaragoza, but Torrejon as well. The problem here is not Torrejon or the F-16s. They are confusing the issue. The problem is freeing our foreign policy from this subordination to U.S. interests into which the PSOE has led us. I know that it is very difficult, but it is also difficult to resolve the Basque problem, and we are going to have to resolve it if we want to consolidate democracy definitively.

[Question] In this connection, it seems that the PSOE is making an effort to collaborate with the other political forces.

[Answer] The government is pursuing a short-term process in connection with the Basque problem. What is wanted basically is for us to sign some papers to see what can be done for the minister of interior, who is fully involved in the matter. A great state undertaking is needed to resolve the Basque problem. The difference between the government and us is that they want to talk about the ETA and to patch up their antiterrorist policy, while we want to talk about the Basque issue. To achieve this, a large-scale political operation is necessary.

[Question] And is this possible?

[Answer] If it is not possible, we will within 10 years still have the problem of terrorism, another Santi Potros will emerge, and things will not have changed.

5157

Factions Reported Forming Within Herri Batasuna

35480025a Madrid TIEMPO in Spanish
26 Oct 87 pp 32-35

[Article by Isabel Martinez: "Split Between Ultranationalists and Revolutionaries Brewing"]

[Excerpts] The division within the Herri Batasuna between the Txomin faction and the militants in the leftist KAS bloc is becoming more acute with the approach of the next internal elections, which will renew the national executive board at the beginning of the year.

In the Herri Batasuna offices and circles, the voices most frequently heard are those of the individuals who place their hopes in what violent activity might do for them, those who are anxiously awaiting the next attack by the

Military ETA, the faction which demonstrates that, as they are accustomed to saying, "The organization is alive, and not even the pressure of two states together can put an end to it."

Three Dividing Lines

The other voices, those of individuals who admit in private that things are going from bad to worse, the voices of those who advocate seeking a solution before the defeat by the police, which Montero recognizes is possible, becomes total, are only heard thus, in private—never beyond the boundaries of the coffee table and the circle of fully trusted intimates.

The Herri Batasuna is showing cracks. It could hardly be otherwise in a conglomerate which encompasses Marxist internationalists such as Txomin Ziluaga and notable lawyers whose model of society is Swedish, such as Inaki Esnaola—an organization in which hard-line trade unionists like Jon Idigoras coexist with prosperous businessmen like Jose Luis Elcoro, who own factories in which more than 100 workers are "exploited."

As of the end of 1987, three basic dividing lines, as well as other auxiliary ones, can be detected in the national executive board of the Herri Batasuna. One separates those who belong to the HASI and the KAS from the rest, who function as independents within the coalition. Another divides those who dream of and periodically wage a battle for institutional incorporation, from the others to whom they are an abomination, because they see in this development the beginning of the end of Herri Batasuna as a consequence of agreement with the other political forces. To these two now historic dividing lines, and above all the first, which is becoming increasingly decisive, a third more recent one is added—that established a year ago in connection with the interpretation of the term "negotiations" between the ETA and the state.

A line as silent as the others separates those who regard this as a means from those who regard it as an end in itself. And more than that—as the one goal of those sought by the Herri Batasuna and the Military ETA which could never be renounced.

The Esnaola Sector

Rallying around these three axes, two sectors have developed among the national executive officers. One is the Txomin sector, headed by Inaki Esnaola, and the other is the Marxist revolutionary sector, headed by Txomin Ziluaga. There is every indication that both are preparing to face off in the internal elections which will renew the membership of the national officers and the intermediary organs of the coalition at the beginning of the year. There even seems to be a split developing in the not too distant future between some militants on the base level in Biscay, who are especially furious with the HASI and everything this party supports.

And one cannot fail to note that, for the first time in the history of radical nationalism, the defense of armed struggle is more the banner of the leftist revolutionaries than of the "abertzales," who are at the present time more desirous of putting an end in the most dignified way possible to the career of the ETA.

Since the beginnings of the Herri Batasuna, the faction headed by Esnaola has been losing ground within the coalition. It lost the battle of institutional participation and had to retire from the parliament in Navarre against its will. In the years of the organizational development of the Herri Batasuna, it lost all its weight in the apparatus of the coalition, which finds the support for its structure and the dynamizing agent of its internal life in the HASI, with the exception of what is happening in Guipuzcoa. And in the end, it lost the daily newspaper EGIN, which dealt the final blow to this faction, the weakness of which was further accentuated by the death of Txomin.

With his disappearance, the link with the leadership of the ETA was lost, since it is now entirely in the hands of individuals with whom there is a poor understanding. "Those in command now all come from the political-military factions, and thus nothing good can be anticipated," a member of the Herri Batasuna affiliated with the Esnaola faction told this periodical, as an illustration of the poor relations this group has with the ETA at the present time. It is a group whose members, in the midst of its organic collapse, have begun to call themselves the Txominis, claiming for the image and the stamp of the late legendary leader.

Just like the rest of the Basque parties, the Herri Batasuna too has territorial divisions. Guipuzcoa is a Txomin zone; in Biscay and Alava, the HASI calls the tune; while Navarre is in dispute.

Both in the national executive board and in the Vitoria parliamentary group, the two sectors have first and last names. According to an internal source, the Txomin sector includes Inaki Esnaola, Jose Luis Elcoro, Alvaro Reizabal, Jose Maria Zubillaga, Jose Miguel Olarra, Joxean Azurmendi, Mikel Arbeloa, Mauricio Olite, Inaki Aldekoa, Jon Goikuria, Koldo Urritikoechea, Fidel Arejita and Tasio Erquicia. The opposition includes Txomin Ziluaga, Jon Idigoras, Sever Ormaza, Perico Solabarria, Itziar Aizpuru, Jokin Gorostidi, Inaki Archanko, Inaki Ruiz de Pinedo, Pablo Gorostiaga, Xabier Bareno, Karmel Echebarria and Jose Maria Bilbao. The Txomin faction in the parliamentary group includes Inigo Iruin, Xabier Amuriza, Alvaro Reizabal, Juan Mari Olano, Rafa Diez and Tasio Erquicia, while on the other side, there are Inaki Ruiz de Pinedo, Pablo Gorostiaga, Edurne Brouard, Jokin Gorostidi, Pipe San Epifanio and Xabier Bareno. This is a six-to-six tie which can only be broken—and this is all symbolism—by a member of the ETA who is in prison in Herrera, and who in his day was a candidate for the post of lendakari—Juan Carlos Yoldi.

SWEDEN

Liberal Party Congress Reinforces Social Concerns Image

Paper Views Party's Challenges

36500007 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER
in Swedish 7 Oct 87 p 2

[Editorial: "Liberal Party Should Be More Daring"]

[Text] Be more daring! That is the theme of the Liberal Party congress that will get under way on Thursday. That kind of appeal would not have been needed before the 1985 election when the Liberals had to win or disappear.

Three years have gone by since the Liberal Party last met for a national congress. Then it was a badly battered party that was trying to find itself under new leadership. Now the delegates can look back on an unprecedented success; an election result that surpassed all expectations.

That put an end to the malicious jokes about the party that could fit into a telephone booth. The Liberals could straighten their shoulders when Bengt Westerberg emerged as the leading opposition politician and the natural candidate for prime minister in the next election. Everything seemed so simple as long as things were going well and the poll figures went higher than the party's election results by a good margin.

Since then a good deal has happened. The Center Party, the Social Democrats and the Conservatives have acquired new party leaders one after another. The political climate that made the "Westerberg effect" possible has changed considerably. With all these "affairs" that suddenly popped up the Liberals have had a harder time arousing interest in their message; they have been better at planning campaigns than at fast footwork in daily political activity. In parliament the party has walked a difficult tightrope between opposition and political results.

The confusion in the nonsocialist camp has rubbed off on the Liberal Party to a certain extent. If the voters expected Westerberg to act as a unifying opposition leader, this has in practice been prevented by his colleagues, the leaders of the Center and Conservative Parties. There is a kind of competitive spirit between Carl Bildt and Westerberg; the problem with Olof Johansson is more a matter of differing opinions.

The minor recoil the Liberal Party has noted in the opinion polls is probably mostly due to changed external circumstances. The requirements today are completely different than they were 2 years ago and the course selection is not as obvious to the party leadership as it was then.

The material the party committee provided for the general political debate at the congress—a kind of program statement—is generally worded and hardly exhibits a sufficiently strong determination to be more daring. One cannot find there the clear priorities and the positions in areas where there are goal conflicts that ultimately determine policy. The positive programmatic stand that the Liberal Party wants to express can easily become much too idyllic and cloying.

The party committee did a better job with the proposed political guidelines that were produced in a number of important areas: schools, assistance, taxes, health care. In these well-prepared documents one finds both a stronger involvement and a new basis in reality. Here one can note that in addition to consolidating itself the Liberal Party has also been able to move at least a few steps forward.

The basis of the Liberal Party's policy is economic growth. That is the aim of tax policy and a necessity if the intentions with regard to education, assistance and health care are to be realized. The desire for reform has intensified in the Liberal Party too; the important thing is to provide enough money for new school books, private rooms in long-term care facilities, etc.

Bengt Westerberg often says that the Liberal Party advocates a general welfare policy. In practice this means that the party wants to retain a big public sector that is primarily financed through taxes. It is logical that the party's executive committee, which wants to reduce the tax burden at a fairly slow pace, puts the major emphasis on the growth-promoting effect of marginal taxes. To some extent tax reform must pay for itself, since Westerberg did not get the party to go along with him on a plan to finance expenditures by lowering basic deductions.

So far this has been the noteworthy exception to the rule that the Liberals tend to endorse the views of their successful party leader. The traces of earlier crises in the party lie so deep that many are still terrified of open disagreement. But we can expect debate on education, perhaps mostly with reference to the grading system, and on how much freedom parents should have to select schools for their children. With respect to regional policy one can detect dissatisfaction on the part of Stockholm, who want more state highway funds, and northerners who feel they have a right to a share of the profits from hydroelectric plants.

The delegates to the congress should be bolder. The Liberal Party is now in a situation where a livelier internal debate would be beneficial. Or to use the party's own flowery language: Liberate the creative individual!

Chairman's Address Blasts Left

36500007 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish
9 Oct 87 p 6

[Article by Ake Ekdahl]

[Text] Freedom and creativity or guardianship and monopoly. That is what next year's election is all about, according to Liberal Party leader Bengt Westerberg.

In a hard attack on the Social Democrats he set the tone for the coming election campaign when the Liberal Party congress opened in People's Hall in Stockholm on Thursday.

There must be a power shift in 1988. This cannot wait. Otherwise a socialist society awaits us with prohibitions, control from above, monopoly and guardianship, according to Westerberg's description.

"A few weeks ago Ingvar Carlsson stood on this platform and said that the Social Democrats should fight for the public sector. 'Don' Carlsson is tilting at windmills. He has completely misrepresented the political debate. Nothing is threatening the public sector. It is the private alternative that is being threatened and Carlsson is the one who is holding the axe.

"The attempt by the Social Democrats to put a stop to private initiative and alternatives is part of their effort to implement a socialist society. Monopoly will rule there. Most things will be owned collectively. Production, investments, business hours and prices will all be decided centrally. Freedom of choice will be restricted there. Responsibility will be shared by all and acknowledged by none," Westerberg said in his description of Social Democratic policy.

Concrete Examples

In a way that has become Westerberg's signature as a speaker he described the inequities in this country, giving concrete examples. Primarily from the Swedish custodial system. He promised that the Liberal Party will stand up and defend the people, teachers, daycare employees and individuals, who get messed up by political bureaucracy and the social apparatus.

"A vote for the Liberal Party should be a vote for the forgotten Sweden," was a well-known Westerberg slogan that drew applause.

Election Program

Westerberg expressed anger over injustice; big international wrongs and small ones here at home. He was also worked up about the Center Party people in Sjöbo; Industrial Minister Thage G. Peterson who "wants to keep money slated for regional policy in his own hands and fritter it away on his trips"; the Conservatives who got the Social Democrats to go along with developing the Edänge waterfall where the endangered Aevia willow herb grows; and Swedish trade barriers that affect textiles produced by developing countries. Not to mention how upset he was about the fact that the TV monopoly was not interested in the private schools that have been shut down in Göteborg.

At the press conference after the speech the usual questions were asked about the nonsocialist government alternative. Three election programs concerning wage-earner funds, privatization and family policy are on the way. More may be ready before the election, Westerberg said.

But he is not in favor of lowering the value-added-tax on food, which is something the Center Party wants. It is a bad proposal. It would be better to give families with children direct subsidies if one wants to benefit them or give the subsidies to the farmers if they are the ones who need help, he said.

Westerberg wants to cut the basic tax deduction in half, an area the Center Party has already declared off-limits in the political debate. This revision and an increase in item taxes would produce 10-15 billion kroner, enough to finance a marginal tax reduction, the most important tax reform of all as far as the Liberals are concerned.

Westerberg is skeptical about repaying the one-time tax, as the Conservatives want to and he also does not think marginal taxes can be reduced as quickly as the Conservatives have suggested.

Emphasis

At the press conference Westerberg also said with reference to his potential government colleagues that the Center Party was strongly opposed to his party people in Sjöbo but that the Conservatives had not been equally explicit.

During the talks at the congress over the next few days other points will probably come up on which the three parties are divided. These could include the Öresund Bridge, the environment, the video law, and the alcohol question.

"The election should give the voters a chance to pick where they want the emphasis of future government policy to lie," Westerberg said.

A 'Social-Liberal Party'

36500007 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish
9 Oct 87 p 2

[Editorial: "A Social-Liberal Party"]

[Text] At the previous congress in 1984, after Bengt Westerberg's first year as party leader, the support for the party leader was mixed with uneasiness for some people who worried that the Liberal Party was limping. Wasn't the social leg shorter than the free market leg and the "soft" issues leg shorter than the "hard" one?

The beginning of this year's national congress showed that this worry is gone. The Liberal Party is walking in a stable social-liberal fashion. The party is in harmony with itself and with its leader.

In his opening speech Bengt Westerberg included passionate segments about the harsh realities faced by many families with handicapped children, the sick and old people in institutions. And about Sweden's obligation to give refugees a place to live. These segments were combined with a strong plea for a free dual restructuring of the public sector, partly so that teachers, nurses and others can have more freedom and more stimulation in their important jobs, and partly so that competitive and private alternatives can be "created rather than destroyed." The leader of the Liberal Party talked more about the environment than about the economy.

This is not just a question of tactical adjustment or of words alone. Westerberg has seen and learned a lot, especially about the sadness and suffering involved in the reality of care provision, which all too often limits human care while those of us who are healthy fail to react with the energy we ought to summon for the purpose. The programs dealing with care and education that the congress will discuss are based on an in-depth analysis, happily free of the usual superior political perspective.

But the situation has also changed. The Liberal Party is no longer a tiny party that needs to feel relegated to working in the giant shadow of the Conservative Party in a future nonsocialist government. And the economy no longer shows enormous deficits that overshadow all other issues.

This new situation creates special tasks and problems. When it comes to the economy the Liberal Party congress runs a risk as great as that confronting the Social Democratic congress. The social ambitions, like the environmental issues and transportation investments, dominate. At the same time the Liberal Party would like to lower taxes. Marginal tax reform will cost around 20 billion kroner in all. The party leader has tried to keep it all together by having the courage to also talk about savings and income enhancement, such as the radically reduced basic tax deduction. Others have been unwilling to be that straightforward.

The party's new position creates expectations that it will also do more than present its own revised program, namely mount a strong opposition. This task in turn has two steps. One is to critically examine the Social Democratic government, its current actions and its plans for the future. The other is to prepare the opposition so that it will be able to take over.

In these respects Bengt Westerberg was less convincing. His speech did not contain any major sections on the Swedish economy or on the nation's most important future issues involving security and European cooperation. Perhaps this should be interpreted as indicating that the Liberal Party stands behind what the government is doing in the foreign policy area and is forced to admit that the government is doing such a good a job of handling the economy that the party might just as well

keep quiet on the subject. In that case Westerberg's silence is a confirmation that the Social Democrats have an extremely good starting point as the 1988 election approaches.

The relative silence about the nonsocialist government alternative is easy to understand. The time for words is past. Now concrete evidence is what counts. In cooperating with the Center Party on family policy, abolishing funds and diversifying ownership, it is easier to take these things up if there is less talk in public about "100-day programs" and "election platforms."

This does not prevent many people from wanting to see something more in an opposition leader than a simple desire to oppose in a situation where the Social Democrats again seem on their way to consolidating a long-term period in power. In one area Bengt Westerberg demonstrated this forcefully in his speech to the congress. That was when he responded to Ingvar Carlsson with respect to the public sector. The Social Democrats are dogmatic on this point, he stated. The debate is not about whether we should have a big public sector but whether it should have a monopoly on social services: "It is the private alternative, not the public sector, whose existence is threatened. And it is Ingvar Carlsson who holds the axe in his hand."

Here the Social Democratic congress helped to enlarge an important difference between liberal and socialist concepts that the voters ought to decide on in 1988. But there must be more issues, including current issues, where there is reason to critically examine the government and the enthusiasm of the opposition.

Papers Around Country Comment

36500007 Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish
10 Oct 87 p 2

[Editorial Roundup]

[Text] Courage for Renewal

It will hardly be the Liberal Party's fault if the desired power shift does not occur in 1988, according to UPSALA NYA TIDNING (Liberal):

"The theme of this year's national congress is 'Be More Daring' and in his speech Westerberg also dared to dispute the Social Democratic claim to a monopoly on the right to describe and interpret Swedish history. With all respect to the Social Democratic reform policy, the basis for what has been accomplished is economic growth and the human liberation that was made possible by liberal reforms that provided more freedom back in the last century. Now a new round of liberating reforms is needed in the areas of district policy, education, daycare and nursing to renew the welfare state, which has become unnecessarily rigid and overbearing on many points."

Soft-Hearted Westerberg

When the right is successful, the Liberal Party becomes neoliberal, when the Social Democrats get the upper hand, the Liberals become social-liberal, was the conclusion of OSTRÅ SMÅLANDS (Social Democrats) with respect to developments since 1985:

"In this way the Liberal Party and Westerberg sneaked into the dressingroom and changed costumes. The neoliberals left the stage and reappeared as the old social liberals. That was the end of the emphasis on market solutions and public spending cuts and instead a soft-hearted Westerberg appeared who wants to give old people in long-term care facilities their own room.

"The pace of things had changed somewhat and guided by their well-developed antennae the Liberals were not slow to realize what the situation required.

"And nonsocialist voters who were repelled by what they justifiably regarded as the brutality of the Conservative message found deliverance in the Liberal Party.

"That is what is usually called the Westerberg effect."

Debate Trick

The leader of the Liberal Party concentrated on challenging the Social Democrats on their own ground, the social area, noted OSTGÖTA-CORRESPONDENTEN (nonsocialist):

"In a now familiar manner he used a concrete example, a mother who had to fight hard to get social assistance for her handicapped son. The opponent, i.e. the government, was depicted—indirectly—as heartless and cruel.

"This debate tactic is effective but dishonest. One cannot attack a general policy by using individual examples. There are always individuals who have problems. In this case it is easy to pick out many examples of the opposite tendency, sunny stories that show how well Sweden cares for the handicapped.

"Westerberg uses individual examples so often that a warning is in order. Westerberg is better when he sticks to his own area, the national economy in the broadest sense of the term.

"Unfortunately his speech at the party congress contained very little along those lines."

TURKEY

Syriac Defections Continue

35540012b Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish
3 Oct 87 p 3

[First paragraph is HURRIYET introduction]

[Text] The 100 Syriac Christians who went to Italy with a group of 190 fans to watch the Besiktas-Inter soccer match held in Milan 2 days ago in the first round of the UEFA Cup competition did not return to Turkey. The Syriac Christians who went to Italy—which does not require visas from Turkish citizens—using the Besiktas match as a pretext will reportedly cross illegally into Germany and Holland and ask for political asylum.

According to information given by officials, the Besiktas fans left for Milan by air in two groups. One group, traveling with Duru Tourism left on Monday, and the second group, traveling with Imti Tours, left on Tuesday. After arrival, 100 persons who were supposed to watch the Besiktas-Inter game disappeared mysteriously.

The remaining 90 people in the group of fans went to the San Siro Meazza stadium to watch the game. However, the Syriac citizens began looking for ways to ask for asylum without going to the game. Officials of the Political Department of the Istanbul Security Directorate reported that the 100 Syriac Christians took large amounts of gold and foreign currency with them and that they will probably cross into the FRG and Holland to ask for political asylum.

9588

Kurdish Patriarch, Former Deputy Describes Loyalties

35540012a Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish
4 Oct 87 pp 13, 18

[Interview with former parliamentary deputy Kinyas Kartal by correspondent Emin Colasan]

[Text]

Guest of the Week: Kinyas Kartal

Kinyas Kartal was born in the Torunkent village of Igdir in 1901. He studied at a military high school in the Soviet Union and later graduated from the Soviet War Academy. After serving in the Soviet army as a lieutenant for some time, Kartal fled to Turkey and took over the leadership of his tribe. Kartal, who is the chief and feudal lord [aga] of the Brukan tribe in Van, was deported three times by the government. Elected to the Turkish Grand National Assembly [TGNA] as a Justice Party deputy from Van in 1965, Kartal served in the

TGNA until the 12 September 1980 operation. At various times, he served as the president of the TGNA by virtue of being "the eldest member." Kartal, who speaks Kurdish and Russian, is married and the father of 10 children.

[Question] Mr Kartal, the story of your life is truly a subject for a novel. You graduated from a Soviet military academy and served as an officer in the Soviet army. Then you fled to Turkey and took over the leadership of your tribe and served as a parliamentary deputy from Van between 1965 and 1980. In the coming 1 November elections you are ranked first on the Correct Way Party [CWP] candidate list for Van. You will probably be elected and go to the TGNA. As on several occasions in the past you will serve as the president of the TGNA by virtue of being "the eldest member" until someone is elected to that position. There is something that I find hard to understand. This is such a big irony. I will ask you about that later. Such a thing cannot happen anywhere except in Turkey. Sir, now you are 87 years old. Would not be better if you did not run in this election and allow younger people to replace you?

[Answer] Sir, let me explain. I had decided not to run. In fact my son is young and is the provincial leader of the CWP in Van. But [Suleyman] Demirel did not permit that. He told me: "You will run; your presence can bring us more votes." I did not want to turn him down.

[Question] How did you come from being an officer in the Soviet army to these days?

[Answer] Sir, let me tell you this story from the beginning. My ancestors migrated from Diyarbakir to Igdir. The land that is now part of the Igdir State Production Farm was all ours in the past. At that time, all those lands were part of Iran. Later, that area came under Russian domination, and my ancestors became Russian subjects. Since we were within Russia at that time, I began going to school in Russia. During that time, our Brukan tribe migrated to Iran and then to Turkey. I lost their trail. Eventually I became a military officer in Russia. I graduated from the military high school in Kiev and then from the military academy in Baku. Then I joined the Russian army as a lieutenant. I was commissioned as an officer in 1922. By that time, the communists had taken over the government in Russia.

[Question] What was your name in the Russian army?

[Answer] My name was Kinyas Fethibekof. I took on the surname Kartal in Turkey. But after I was commissioned as an officer, my mind was on my mother, father and tribe. Because I had been broken away from them. There was no communication and no mail. The Russians occupied Yerevan and declared an Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic. I arranged to be posted at the military commissariat of Nakhichevan. My whole intention was to go to that area and look for my family and my tribe. I then learned that my people first migrated to Iran and

then to Turkey and settled in Van. My late father joined the War of Liberation with 600 cavalymen. While fighting under the command of Rustu Pasa, the commander of the 9th Caucasus Division, he was martyred by the Armenians. Let me not bore you with the details, sir. I came to Van and rejoined my family and tribe in 1924.

[Question] In other words, did you desert the Russian army?

[Answer] Of course. How else could I have come?

[Question] Do you know if the Russians took any legal action against you after learning that you had fled?

[Answer] I do not know that. Many people ran away at that time. It was easy to escape, because the border was not as tightly controlled as it is today.

[Question] Mr Kartal, today you are the head of a very large tribe. How many people are there in your Brukan tribe?

[Answer] When I rejoined my tribe in 1924, it consisted of 10,000 households. Now, I believe we have a population of 100,000.

[Question] Sir, how does one become a tribal chief? Is it done through elections?

[Answer] One does not become a tribal chief by election or similar processes. Those things are for officials. We have inherited this from our grandfathers and fathers. We do not have an official leadership capacity. I love them, and they love and respect me. Everything in this world is based on love.

[Question] Does your entire tribe live in Van?

[Answer] They live in Van as well as in villages.

[Question] How many villages do you have?

[Answer] We have 105 villages. Moreover, we have three neighborhoods in Van. These three neighborhoods belong to our tribe.

[Question] How many votes will your tribe cast in these coming elections? You said a total of 100,000—how many voters do you have?

[Answer] We have 20,000 voters. Our tribe can cast 20,000 votes.

[Question] Sir, what is the nature of this tribal chiefdom? For example, if you ordered them to die would your tribe die for you? Or, if you said "come after me," would everyone follow you?

[Answer] You must understand that everything in this world is based on love. Love is a more powerful weapon than the atomic or hydrogen bomb. If you can create that love then everything will be well. Those who are not liked and supported by the tribe will naturally lose all their influence.

[Question] Does your tribe love you?

[Answer] I believe they do.

[Question] If you say "follow me" would they follow you?

[Answer] That depends on what you are proposing.

[Question] As the tribal chief do you ever take any money from them?

[Answer] Thank God, I do not take any money from the tribe. But if I were to tell them "I need help," they would help me with all their means. They would sacrifice everything they have for me. But I would rather die than ask them for something like that. I have not proposed anything like that in my entire life. Because if I ask for something like that, I would be the first to feel indignant. May God never put me in that position. Money is a very sensitive matter. When material issues come into play a man loses his dignity. I would never ask them for help.

[Question] Do they ask you for help?

[Answer] Yes, they do, and I help them. I help them now. Now, you may say: "You are a rich man." But I am not. They never let me to become rich. I built a house three times, and this government tore down my house three times. Each time I returned and rebuilt my house. The government tore it down, I rebuilt it.

[Question] Did they tear down your houses because they were not licensed, or because of the Kurdish question?

[Answer] There was no question of construction licenses. Nor did they call me a Kurd. They just deported me.

[Question] Now let us turn to that issue. Are you Turkish or Kurdish? That is, how do you see yourself in that respect?

[Answer] Sir, let me explain you something. The Russians occupied Erzurum during World War I while I was still in military high school in Russia. They celebrated the event there. Let me assure you that that night I wept bitterly in my bed. You may ask: "Why did you weep?" In my view, religion comes before nationalism. Being a Muslim I felt a deep affection for the Turkish nation because the Turks were the greatest defenders of Islam. Sir, I am a man who has pined for this country in Russia. I knew that if the state of the Turkish nation collapses, the Islamic religion would also collapse. That is why I wept.

[Question] Sir, you are weeping now.

[Answer] I wept then, and I weep now. (Kartal's words become unintelligible as he sobs. Kartal weeps.)

[Question] Mr Kartal, everything that has happened to you has happened because of your Kurdish ancestry. I will ask you about that later. But let me first ask you this: Where do you put yourself as a Turk or as Kurd?

[Answer] Sir, let me explain that to you. God has commanded that liars be punished. I am of Kurdish ancestry. But I am more devoted to this country than many Turks. You may ask: "Then why do you not say that you are Turkish?" I would be proud to be Turkish. I would like to have been Turkish. But today everyone knows that I am a member of a tribe. If I say "this or that" then they would say: "Look at Kinyas Aga. He is wagging his tail. He says he is this and that." That is why I am a person who has never lied in his life.

[Question] Sir, do not misunderstand me. I am not one who judges people on the basis of their ancestry. Just as you said, there are Kurds who are more devoted to this country than many Turks. We have so many citizens of Turkish ancestry who race with each other to rob their country and nation. For example, I have two readers of Armenian ancestry who live abroad and with whom I correspond. Their names are Albert Azaryan and Paul Susikyan. These two people are more attached to Turkey than many of us. You, too, are saying that you are Kurdish, but that you are Turkish in your heart and in your mind.

[Answer] That is naturally true. We are the people of this land; we are part of this homeland.

[Question] Sir, is this Kurdish issue a serious problem in our country? How do you view this matter?

[Answer] This is a very broad issue. If you will allow me, let us not discuss this—and let me say why. In any event, let us not discuss that subject at all. It is a very sensitive issue. Sir, let me tell you something. I am from Van. I love the people of that region. I lived and grew up in that region. I have always believed in God's justice. Nature has not treated Van, the Aegean and Cukurova equally. It has endowed those other areas with abundance, and it has given us rocks and snow. But even under those circumstances past governments did not treat us as fairly as they did the western provinces. We suffered their accusations and oppression. The torture we suffered united the people of Eastern Anatolia. What unites us is the misery we have suffered together. That much I would like to say.

[Question] I understand. But with all that has happened in the past do the Kurds still love the Turks?

[Answer] Let me explain that, too. Sir, the Kurds love the Turks very much. You may ask: "Where does that love come from? Why would they love them so much?" Firstly, both of them are Muslim. This concept of religion is so extensive and so deep that one cannot dismiss it. On the other hand, the Arabs are also Muslims, but they do not feel any attachment to the Turks. Sir, may God give better days to this country.

[Question] God willing, we all hope so. That is what we all want.

[Answer] Sir, it is fine for you. But for a moment think about us. Do you approve of the incidents in the East? I do not. Sir, at a time when there were no roads for oxcarts in Turkey, the Ottoman government built a railway to Jiddah. But the Arabs still do not like us. I am not saying that the Arabs are good people. They have never liked us. But why have they not liked us? Because we have always had some mismanagement or made some mistake. If the Arabs are bad, these people are bad, those people are bad, are we always the good ones? The poor Kurd is giving his life and blood for you. You send him to war and he gets killed. And he does not ask anything in return. He is an ignorant man. If you scratch his back just a little bit, he would be very happy. Show him some care and affection. You must show affection to the Easterner. That man is only asking for care and affection from you. If you do that he would give his life for you. Sir, you must understand that the Jew has Israel to go to. The Armenian has Russia to go to. Everyone has a place to go to, but we have no place to go. We are the people of this land and this country.

[Question] I understand you, Mr Kartal. How many times were you deported because of your Kurdish ancestry?

[Answer] They deported me three times. They did not even accuse me of being Kurdish; they just deported me. They first deported me after the Sheikh Sait rebellion in 1926. Then they deported me in 1937. Most recently, they deported me after the 27 May 1960 revolution.

[Question] That means that you were first deported during the Ataturk period. Did you participate in the Sheikh Sait rebellion? Had you committed an offense?

[Answer] If there was such a thing, I would surely be tried. Unfortunately, at that time nobody asked such questions. It was simply because we were of Kurdish ancestry.

[Question] What happened in 1937 to cause your deportation?

[Answer] What do you think happened? What happened in 1960? Just as much happened in 1937.

[Question] Were you deported after the 12 September operation?

[Answer] Thank God they did not deport me that time. The 12 September revolution was the most comfortable revolution I have experienced (laughter).

[Question] In other words, you went through the 12 September operation without suffering any losses?

[Answer] My loss was that the TGNA was dissolved, and I lost my parliamentary deputy status. Thank God that I lost it. May God give long life to Gen Kenan Evren. The salary that I received while I was a member of the Assembly was barely enough to live on. After the operation, I worked for myself for 7 or 8 years and was able to save some money. I am running for a parliamentary seat in the coming elections on 1 November. I am afraid that I will spend all the money that I saved.

[Question] What work did you do to save that money?

[Answer] I had a property. I turned it into a shopping arcade. My son has a pharmacy. That arcade now brings me 2 million Turkish lira a month. I also have some farmland. I worked on my land.

[Question] Did they not confiscate your lands after the 27 May revolution? Were you eventually able to recover those lands?

[Answer] That is a good question. Let me explain. (He points to the recording machine.) Now is that machine recording what we are saying?

[Question] Yes, it is.

[Answer] We were deported after the 27 May revolution. We were put in jail and then released. They seized 9,500 donums [1 donum equals 940 square meters] of my land. They seized land from other landlords [aga], too, but later they returned them. It has been 27 years since then, and I am still waiting for the government to return my lands. We filed a lawsuit with the Council of State and we won it. The Council of State said "give it back," but the government has not complied. The bureaucracy has not complied. I have not been able to recover my lands despite judicial decisions in my favor. Apparently the bureaucracy is more powerful than the court decisions of this country. It was apparently in our Constitution and the President often used to say: "Turkey is a state of law." Unfortunately, that statement is quite questionable. If the supremacy of the law exists, why have not court decisions been implemented for so many years? Fortunately, I am still able to use those lands. But the title deed is not in my name. Could you please write these verbatim.

[Question] I will write them verbatim, sir.

[Answer] In other words, all the 55 landlords [aga] recovered their lands except myself. I was a parliamentary deputy for 15 years between 1965 and 1980. You know that anarchy and terrorism had engulfed our

country prior to the 12 September operation. One province where this situation did not exist was Van. The reason that was so is myself and the circle to which I belong. We did not allow it. But as a reward, they deported me; they seized my land and did not return it. Sir, I have endorsed the philosophy of the Justice Party [JP]. I have deep respect and affection for Suleyman Demirel. These leftists carried pictures of Stalin and others rather than Ataturk's in their rallies in Istanbul. In my old age, I led the "Respect for the Flag" rallies that the JP organized to counter them. That is my duty. I am a man who loves his country. I am a Turk. Naturally, I love and respect the Turkish flag. I consider it my duty. But despite all that I was always hurt and deprived of justice.

[Question] But, sir, you have served as a parliamentary deputy beside Suleyman Demirel for 15 years. When Demirel was prime minister you could have asked Demirel to have your lands returned. Demirel could have issued an order and you could have recovered your lands.

[Answer] Sir, I never took this matter to Mr Demirel. At that time, Ismet Sezgin was the Minister of Finance. I told him a few times. Unfortunately, despite all our efforts, he, too, could not clear the matter through the bureaucracy.

[Question] Perhaps the government's intelligence agencies have secret reports on you. Is that possible?

[Answer] Sir, let me tell you something. I believe that there are such reports. You may ask: "Have you seen them with your own eyes?" No, I have not. But I am under surveillance.

[Question] In other words, MIT [National Intelligence Organization] or others keep you under surveillance. Is that correct?

[Answer] I am under surveillance. Sir, I have served as a parliamentary deputy for 15 consecutive years. I was the president of the TGNA for 6 to 7 months by virtue of being the eldest member. Despite all that, I am under surveillance.

[Question] That is truly very painful. Have all these happened to you because you are Kurdish?

[Answer] One day, in the post-27 May period, Mucip Atakli, a member of the National Unity Committee, had a conversation with me. He is now deceased, may God bless his soul. At that time, we had been deported to Sivas and other places. Then we contacted these people. Atakli told me: "My father is Albanian, but I am a Turk." And I said: "I, too, am a Turk. My father is Kurdish, but I say I am a Turk. But you do not want to accept that I am a Turk." He asked: "How so?" I replied: "You refer to me as 'Kinyas Kartal who is of Kurdish

ancestry.' Your father is of Albanian ancestry, but you say that you are a Turk and you are free. My father is Kurdish. I say that I, too, am a Turk, but I never manage to be free (long laughter)."

[Question] Are you still under surveillance?

[Answer] I believe I am.

[Question] In other words, are you under surveillance because you are of Kurdish ancestry?

[Answer] Of course. In fact, because of that they cut my telephone line for many years after the 12 September operation. They left me without a telephone at my age.

[Question] You were elected parliamentary deputy from Van continuously between 1965 and 1980. Did everyone in your 100,000-strong tribe vote for you, or were there votes cast for parties other than the JP in your ballot boxes?

[Answer] Sir, let me explain that as well. In life there is nothing that is certain. But if there is anything that is the least uncertain, it is our tribe. Mr Demirel knows this, and everyone close to him also knows this. In fact, when the ballot box supervisor came to the village on election days, our villagers would tell him: "For years there have been no votes for the opposition in our ballot boxes. You, too, should vote for our party." Often they would persuade him. In other words, in our villages no votes are cast for others. Not one vote is cast to any party except ours.

[Question] Suppose in the 1 November elections some votes are cast in your ballot boxes to parties other than the CWP. Then what would you do?

[Answer] That is impossible. It cannot ever happen. Let me explain why. I was in the Bursa prison after the 27 May revolution. They asked me: "There will be a referendum on the Constitution. Shall we vote for or against it?" I told my people: "Vote for it. So that we can be freed from this administration." The village I stay in is called Ozkoy. My late mother, God bless her soul, was alive then. After the ballot boxes were opened, nine red "no" votes were found in the ballot box of my village. The village head then was Hacı Resit Kartal, who is my uncle's son. My cousin immediately began shouting: "Which coward did this?" My mother told him: "Wait a moment. Do not rush to call people names. I did that." They asked her: "Why did you do it? We cast these 'yes' votes after consulting with your son." My mother replied: "My son was probably afraid of these people to tell you to vote 'yes.' That is why I voted 'no.'" As God knows, I was frightened by them. Otherwise, would I tell them to vote "yes"? My mother understood this and persuaded nine women in the village to vote "no." Otherwise, nobody can persuade our tribe.

[Question] Did you learn Turkish after coming to Turkey or have you always spoken it?

[Answer] Liars be cursed. My mother tongue is Kurdish. I did not have my elementary, middle and higher education in Turkey. Then I entered the TGNA. Of course, by speaking I advanced my knowledge of Turkish. I still have many deficiencies, but relatively I speak well.

[Question] Sir, you graduated from a military school in Russia and served as an officer there. Do you receive any retirement pay from the Russian army? (Laughter)

[Answer] I ran away from there and came here. I ran away from there to rejoin my homeland. I got into so many problems there. I faced the firing squad. They put my hands over my head and made me kneel on the ground. Do you know what I thought at that moment? Now I will die here and my family will not know about it. My family will not even know where my grave is (Kartal weeps again). I was saved the last minute. These are long stories.

[Question] Sir, you are the honorable Kinyas Aga. How many wives do you have?

[Answer] Half a wife. In fact, I have only one, but being incapacitated she counts as half. I had 10 children. One of them is dead. Currently, I have nine living children. In addition, I have 21 grandchildren. Our full family numbers nearly 5,000.

[Question] Mr Kartal, I know that you are humorous and eloquent person. I have also heard that you are very upset with communists and leftists. For example, you have reportedly said: "Anyone who is not a communist before he is 25 is an ass. Anyone who is a communist after he is 25 is an even bigger ass."

[Answer] I use that phrase, but it has not originated from me. It has been used by others before me. I was a leftist in my youth.

[Question] While you were in the Russian army?

[Answer] Yes. In fact, I was a leftist even during the Czarist period. But after I came to Turkey I realized that the leftists in this country are enemies of the country. My leftism was in Russia. Later I became a rightist. But here they even called me a "communist."

[Question] You served as the president of the TGNA for lengthy periods by virtue of being the eldest member. Some of the remarks you made while speaking on the podium made everyone laugh. For example you would say: "Wait a minute brother. We will let you speak, too. Do not aggravate me." Even in the most tense of times people would cheer for you saying: "Long live Kinyas Aga." At times, journalists also caused you aggravation.

One colleague of ours wrote at the time: "While presiding over the Assembly, Kinyas Aga sleeps without letting anyone know." Then you summoned that colleague and reprimanded him saying: "Was I sleeping, you rascal?"

[Answer] Sir, that story is unfounded.

[Question] Another time, a colleague of ours took a picture of you while you were putting on your formal costume to take your seat in the Assembly. You reportedly dropped your pants and told him: "Come and take a picture of this, too."

[Answer] I swear that that story is unfounded.

[Question] When Bulent Ecevit was prime minister, you were, once again, the president of the TGNA. You reportedly asked your staff to arrange for an appointment with the prime minister, but you did not show up. Is that also a lie?

[Answer] Let me explain. That is true. At the time I said: "Arrange an appointment with the prime minister." Ecevit reportedly said: "He is welcome to see me." But when the appointment time came, I did not show up.

[Question] In other words, you stood Ecevit up.

[Answer] Yes, that is true.

[Question] Why did you not show up?

[Answer] For some reason, I always thought of Suleyman Demirel whenever one mentioned the "prime minister." I had really asked for an appointment with Suleyman Demirel. But by a slip of tongue I apparently said: "Arrange an appointment with the prime minister." So they went and arranged an appointment with Ecevit. What I had in mind was to see Demirel. At the time, I could not imagine another person being the prime minister. That is why I did not go and meet with Ecevit. (At this point I am cracking with laughter.)

[Question] Are you bothered by the fact that you are under surveillance?

[Answer] Everything comes to one's mind. We have had many painful experiences (Kartal's eyes fill with tears). Last year, a friend from National Security came here. We sat and spoke privately. I told him: "I see a fault in you. You do not treat the East and the West equitably. Once you mark a man from the East, there is no escape for that man. Do not do that, please." Mr Colasan, I am a man who is under surveillance, but we truly love this country very much. So much that, I have led the "Respect for the Turkish Flag" rallies in this country. You may ask: "Do you not have any dignity, pride and integrity? How can you show so much affection to the man who oppresses you so much?"

[Question] Which man, sir?

[Answer] The state, sir, the state. We always felt respect and affection for this state and homeland. Let me recount you one event. In my youth, I was studying at a school called "Gymnasium" in Russia. I had returned to my village for the Easter holiday. After the defeat of the Turkish army at Sarikamis in 1915 at Russian hands, the Russian soldiers pillaged all the weapons of the Turkish army and were selling them in the villages. They were selling the weapons of thousands of martyred Turkish soldiers. One day, they brought such weapons to our village loaded on the top of six horses. They began bargaining with my father in our house. Among the weapons, there was one beautiful rifle with a yellow stock. I never forget, there was a long bloodstain on the stock of rifle. My father's cousin, may God bless his soul, told my father: "Bedir, let us buy this gun for you. It is a beautiful gun." My father pointed to the bloodstain and said: "Mehmet, this is the blood of a martyred Turkish soldier. My conscience would not permit me to have this gun. A gun which has the blood of a Turkish soldier on it would not bring us good fortune. My hand would never be able to pull the trigger of that gun." And my father did not buy that gun (Kartal's eyes fill with tears once again.)

[Question] Sir, at 87 you are a very healthy person. Now we are talking to you in your home. You live on the fifth floor of an apartment building, and there is no elevator in the building. That means that you climb these stairs every day. How have you managed to stay so healthy? Do you drink or smoke? Do you watch what you eat?

[Answer] I quit smoking 39 years ago. Sir, I do not like lying. I have engaged in all types of vice. I have done most of the things God forbids. I have drunk an oceanful of alcoholic beverages. But I observe the fast [during Ramadan]. I have also regularly said my prayers for the last 15 years. But, even today, when we get together with friends I consume alcoholic drinks. Nowadays, I cannot drink as much as I used to. In the past, I would drink a bottle of raki as an aperative before dinner. And I would do that alone in an hour. At that time, fifty doctors could examine me and say: "This man has not drunk anything." I was born in the Caucasus. I have breathed the air of the mountains. I never drank milk from a feeding bottle. I drank only my mother's milk. Then I grew up on whatever my mother fed me. For me, 80, 90 or 100 years of age does not mean anything. But God may take my life today if he so wishes. I believe in that. Let me also say something else. I do not see myself as being 86 years old. In reality, I am only 43 years old. Since I do not live the nights, I do not count half my years. If you count the nights I am 86 years old, but I see myself as being 43 years old. I am well in every respect.

[Question] Do you watch what you eat?

[Answer] I eat whatever I find. But I drink somewhat less now.

[Question] Mr Kartal, now, once again, we have a very interesting situation. You are saying that you are a marked man. The government is keeping you under surveillance. But you will be the president of the Assembly that will convene after the 1 November elections because you will be the eldest member. In that case, a person who is under government surveillance and who is considered objectionable by the government will be the president of the nation's parliament. Is that not right?

[Answer] That is true (shrugs). What can I do, sir? I ask you: What can I do?

[Question] Such irony can probably not be found in any other country in the world. Mr Kartal, I thank you very much for this conversation. I wish you a healthy life and much success in the future.

9588

FRANCE

Dassault Income Falls, Layoffs Planned

35190014a Paris LIBERATION in French

18 Sep 87 p 9

[Article by Jean Guisnel]

[Text] Things are going very badly for Dassault, which yesterday announced a sharp drop in profits. At 42.56 million francs before taxes for the first 6 months of 1987, profits are 90.2 percent below those for the same period in 1986. It has also been learned that the unions are no longer fearing the elimination of 400 more jobs at Dassault but of 1,300 or even 1,500. During the Le Bourget Air Show last June, the firm's management did not deny that a lack of new military export orders might lead it to consider such measures, which would follow the 833 employee cutbacks announced in 1986. But the figures mentioned in June, even by union sources, did not exceed 400.

Decidedly more alarmist rumors are circulating today, and Serge Dassault, the firm's chairman and managing director [PDG], is expected to bring them up at a meeting of the central enterprise committee before the end of the month—unless he already analyzed the situation at a regular meeting of the board of directors in Istres yesterday. One thing is sure: the PDG has already warned that any possible overmanning can no longer be absorbed solely through the early retirement of employees over 55 years of age.

Is the firm headed toward out-and-out layoffs? The company's situation is growing worse every week. Excluding the 35 Mirage-2000's for the French Air Force that are ordered every year, no new military orders have been recorded for over 18 months. In view of that situation, the return to work in September following vacations has been a little agitated in all the plants belonging to that firm, which is the symbol of the French aeronautical industry. While the CGT is assigning greater importance to national demands as it focuses its activities on preparations for the day of action on 1 October, the CFDT has decided to publish pamphlets attacking the firm's "managers," whom it accuses of having neglected to strengthen trade channels and to expand the firm's range of products or its projects in international cooperation.

In general outline, those criticisms match the ones that could have been made in recent months by Minister of Defense Andre Giraud, who is now refraining, however, from mentioning the case in public. Not because he has changed his views, but simply to avoid having to suffer the assaults of those who might see his attitude as simply a reflection of his legendary enmity for Marcel's heir. Andre Giraud's current discretion in this matter does not prevent him, however, from being active behind the

scenes. In recent weeks, for example, the American press has reported several times on contacts and discussions between the French minister of defense and industrial circles across the Atlantic.

In its issue for 7 September, the magazine AVIATION WEEK reported on contacts in Paris between McDonnell Douglas, represented by its president, and the French minister of defense. The purpose of the meetings: to discuss France's possible participation in the modernization program for the F-18 aircraft that is being considered by the U.S. Navy. The latter would very much like to sell that aircraft to the French Navy, which will have to find successors to its carrier-borne Crusader aircraft by 1993 and which knows that the naval version of the Rafale will not enter service until 1996 at the earliest. The Ministry of Defense will neither confirm nor deny those discussions, nor, for that matter, will it confirm or deny discussions concerning possible U.S. participation in the radar program for the Rafale. Denials would have been surprising, since Andre Giraud makes no secret of his feelings about the failure of cooperation in the area of fighter planes. That failure has resulted in two competing projects in Europe: the Rafale and the EFA (European Fighter Aircraft). In his opinion, the salvation of the French aeronautical industry will necessarily depend on cooperative projects. And he is not far from thinking that the sooner the better.

Many French industrialists are beginning to look with dread at the drama taking shape on the horizon. Dassault's situation inspires these alarmist reflections in one of France's biggest employers: "An industrial disaster on a national scale is brewing. The time to react is already here.... That company was founded by a genius, a description that cannot be applied to his son. You can't get rid of an Oedipus complex at the age of 65!" Dassault's subcontractors, both large and small, are starting to look for other partners, not always successfully, and are hoping for a rapid change. They care little whether it comes, as one of the aircraft manufacturer's large partners puts it, "from a putsch, an alliance with the Americans, or a resumption of cooperation with the Europeans. The drama is possible today, although it is still conceivable that they will pull out of it. They have a solid foundation, and their technology is still as good as before, but they can't get over the basic error of believing that the lucrative markets in the Middle East are going to last forever."

Self-criticism has never been a strong point with the firm in Saint-Cloud, which will continue, as it has in the past, to blame others for its troubles. The editorial in the BULLETIN D'INFORMATION PERIODIQUE (BIP), published for Dassault's managerial staff and distributed in the group's plants since last Thursday, is unusual in its clarity. While congratulating Jacques Chirac for having given the Rafale the go-ahead at the latest Le Bourget Air Show, it also accuses Andre Giraud of having "done everything he could not to start the program." Among its other courtesies, the BIP, which has been conspicuous

only on very rare occasions for its independence with respect to Dassault's management, quite simply accuses the Ministry of Defense of trying "to start an underground war by quibbling over the exact definition (of the Rafale) for months and months" and by "delaying the signing of contracts, which boils down to draining the company's funds a little more." Is Andre Giraud going to put up for long with the scapegoat role that Dassault would like to make him play?

11798

ITALY

Law Strengthens Powers of Defense Officials
35280038a Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian
11/12 Oct 87 p 8

[Article: "Defense and the Chief of General Staff Will Have More Power in the Hierarchy"]

[Text] Rome—The law on the reorganization of top posts in the military—approved 2 days ago by the Council of Ministers and which reiterates the text presented during the preceding legislature by the then Minister of Defense Giovanni Spadolini—strengthens the top of the military organization, especially the roles of the Defense Chief of General Staff and the General Secretary of Defense. The law is a first step to an overall revision of the sector.

The main theme of the reform is contained in the report accompanying the law: it is "a process for military planning by means of which the [initial] phase of modification on the part of the individual Armed Force reaches final modification through the Defense Chief of General Staff, after having been critically scrutinized by the High Council of the Armed Forces and by the Committee of the Chiefs of General Staff."

The Defense Chief of General Staff therefore assumes a "position of preeminence as the one responsible for the general planning of the military and has the overall operational responsibility for the coordination of all the Armed Forces." (Article 3).

The General Secretary of Defense—continues the text—undertakes an important function, as "responsible for coordination and control of the execution of technical and financial programs associated with military operational planning, and is responsible, at the national and international levels, for military research, development, production, and procurement activities." (Article 4)

The law leaves intact the right of the Chiefs of Staff of the three armed forces to present proposals to the minister, and allows them to participate, individually or collectively, in the activities of the Defense Chief of Staff and the General Secretary on matters concerning military planning, within the Commission of the Chiefs of Staff and the High Council of the Armed Forces.

Additionally, the report points out that the law "does not, nor does it want to, cause a complete reorganization of the Defense Ministry, since it is aimed only at the central operational nucleus of the military," and that the government promises to present "a project for the reorganization of all the branches of the ministry."

13120/09599

Report on Air Force Situation, Prospects
35280038b Rome AVIAZIONE in Italian
Apr 87 p 158, 201

[Article by Nico Sgarlato: "Report and Outlook on the Air Force" with English summary]

[Text] In the annual report to the specialized press on the state of health of the Italian Air Force, Gen Franco Pisano, Air Chief of Staff, outlined the main activities carried out by the Air Force in 1986 and illustrated the future studies and acquisition programs.

Last year the Air Force chalked up 158,000 flying hours (4,000 more compared to the previous year) carried out by the operative units and the support squadrons. Also reassuring was the ratio of flying accidents with a figure of 0.19 every 10,000 flying hours, a figure very close to the 1983 record. Besides these purely technical aspects, Gen Pisano pointed out that on the air bases there were none of the cases, denigrated by the press and public opinion, of senior airmen playing cruel and practical jokes on newer recruits, suicides, drug-taking and other such things upsetting the young people doing their national service.

The second part of the conference regarded the funds and the manner in which they will be used in the future programs of the air force. Five thousand three hundred sixty billion lire, besides the expense of maintenance, will be spent to acquire the Tornado, SAM Spada/Aspide batteries, for the development and start on the production of the AMX and, lastly, for the ASA updating of the F104. These programs further include the phase of development of the EFA, the choice of replacement of the NIKE and the choice of a modern AWACS system.

On the occasion of the annual meeting with reporters, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Franco Pisano, took the opportunity to report on the activities of the Air Force during 1986 and delineated a few important objectives for the future.

In 1986, operational, training, and support activities of the Air Force tallied a total of 158,000 flight hours, an increase of 4,000 over the previous year. The fighters detachments accumulated 64,000 hours (18,000 on the F-104S which have increased their air defense activities); the training schools aircraft tallied 41,000 hours, and the support detachments 53,000.

Concerning training, it is to be pointed out that in 1986 the cadets' training was conducted with the MB.339 up to graduation to military pilot. This was achieved by adding about 40 missions which included elementary combat, tactical formation flying, and target shooting, and therefore subtracting a portion of the syllabus from the G.91T aircraft.

The year 1986 was also positive (in a "cautious way" the report emphasizes) in terms of flight safety, with 0.19 accidents per 10,000 flight hours, the second lowest rate ever behind 1983.

General Pisano pointed out that the Air Force cadets did not experience—or experienced only minimally—the type of incidents reported among the recruits of other corps of the armed forces and which have been subject of controversies (such as suicides, drug abuse, harassment of new recruits, and accidents). This indicates that the Air Force has obtained positive results toward the well being of the 54,000 young recruits that serve their term every 12 months.

But the most interesting part of the report concerned the requirements and the on-going or planned programs for maintaining the effectiveness of the Air Force which, for 1987, has asked for a budget of 5,360 billion lire, equal to about 33 percent of the defense budget (excluding 3,093 billion for the carabinieri). The allocation of this sum foresees increases of 5.7 percent for personnel and well-being expenses, 2.8 percent increase for training, 14.4 percent increase for modernization, all at the expense of research which will be reduced by 23.7 percent.

From General Pisano's presentation we learn that the following expenditures are planned: 550 billion for the Tornado, 200 for the Spada/Aspide systems, 200 for continued development and production start up of the AMX, 93 for the F-104 ASA, 10 for the MB.339, 131 for the definition phase of the EFA, 104 for the acquisition of the NH-500 helicopters for training purposes, 80 for modernization of the HH-3F rescue craft, 10 for the inflight fueling/cargo planes, 18 for the acquisition of flight simulators for the Tornado and MB.339, 15 for the communication sector and the ACCAM (Communication Centers Automation) program, 60 for air defense sensors, and 85 for modernization of infrastructures.

There was also an opportunity to talk about future programs and on-going programs such as the modifications to the Atlantic systems for which 35 billion have already been allocated, or other programs having funding problems, like the initiation of the EFA construction phase (for which there's a minimum initial requirement of 165 airplanes), the search and acquisition of a substitute for the Nike missile, and an AEW aircraft of which there's a need for 4-6 units. A choice has not been made yet for the AEW, but since the modified G.222 and C-130H have been judged inadequate, the most logical solution seems the choice of the E-3 Sentry like those of

the USAF and NATO. Already underway is the modernization process for the Air Force C3 systems (command, control, and communications) by means of ACCAM and SIAM (AM information system); ACCAM will be completed within 1990 and SIAM within the current year. The definition phase of the SICRAL satellite (Italian classified communications and warning satellite) has been accomplished through a project involving all the military branches and which foresees placement into orbit in 1992.

In answering the reporters' questions, Pisano had the opportunity to state that the Air Force is more than satisfied with the MB.339A and therefore, it presently doesn't plan to buy the MB.339C.

In the transport sector, the development of the FIMA and FLA projects for a future substitute of the Hercules is seen as yielding results only in a very distant future; at the moment, it seems more opportune to refurbish to their original levels the C-130 and G.222 fleet (and this program is in part already started with the order of three G.222 financed by FIO/PC funds). Also mentioned was the program NATO ACCS (Airborne Command and Control System), the acquisition of smart bombs referring probably to the Paveway laser guided bombs of Texas Instruments, and the adoption of personal air-surface missiles for the defense of bases following the army's choice between the Stinger and Mistral.

Comments on the more distant future were not lacking, as General Pisano pointed out that the Air Force follows with interest every advanced development in aerospace, and made reference to satellite and space vehicles activities.

13120/09599

Aeritalia To Provide China With Avionics, Testing Equipment

35280045 Rome IL FIORINO in Italian 15 Oct 87 p 4

[Article by Giovanni Anzidei]

[Text] Peking. Aeritalia and the national Chinese aeronautics industry, Catic, have signed a contract according to which the Italian firm is to provide an interference testing station for avionics systems and instrumentation mounted on board the Chinese fighter A-5. The 2-billion-lire contract was announced at the time of the "1987 China Aviation Expo," the second Chinese airshow inaugurated in Peking by vice Prime Minister Li Peng. In order to symbolize the agreement, Aeritalia and Catic set up an appropriate stand at the show to which Li Peng devoted much attention. In recent months Aeritalia has redesigned all the avionics of the A-5 fighter which was patterned after the Soviet MiG, and the new on-board systems are to be entirely supplied by Italian industry, including companies such as Fiar, Litton, Omi, Microtecnica, etc., who have been brought into the operation by Aeritalia. The most highly advanced parts

of the new on-board systems made in Italy are the navigation computers, the attack systems (identification of target and tracking), as well as the computers for processing meteorological data and flight plan plotting. The Chinese have a fleet of several hundred A-5's and their modernization—in addition to being good business (about 1.5 billion lire per aircraft)—will pave the way to future cooperation, including a new version of the aircraft which the Chinese would like to export.

Aeritalia has another contract in progress with the Chinese Catic for the supply of a series of 100 doors for the Atr 42. There is a similar contract between Catic and Aerospatiale to produce the wing tips also for the Atr 42, a regional transport with 40-70 seats, 50 percent of which is built by Aeritalia and Aerospatiale. The Chinese navigation company Caac is to buy a certain number of 50-seater aircraft, and they might just choose the Atr. The Caac also has a current contract with Alfa Romeo Avio, a member of the Aeritalia group, for the overhaul of the Boeing 737 and 747 engines and the Md 80's. This contract should bring Alfa Romeo Avio about 150 billion lire in sales over 10 years, but it is expected that the contract will be extended to other engines. The Chinese aerospace industry is attracting all the major companies in the field; 20 countries with 260 companies are represented at this airshow, nearly twice as many as the 130 which participated in the first Chinese airshow last year.

Also representing Italy on a major scale is Agusta, which has attracted much interest from the Chinese armed forces for three of its products: the Mangusta A-129 antitank helicopter for the army, the Agusta-Westland Eh-101 antisubmarine helicopter for the navy, and the S-211 training aircraft.

In the field of trainers Aermacchi is also present with the latest version of its 339, one of the most successful aircraft in the international arena as demonstrated by the numerous sales made abroad. The Italian presence is also developing in other aeronautical fields with Selenia, the Selenia Elsas group, the flight assistance company, Nardi, Vitroselenia, Face Standard, Aereo, Avio Interiors, and Iacobucci. A stand was set up by Aia, the association of Italian aerospace industries.

13312/9738

NORWAY

Jan Mayen Island Seen Having Greater Strategic Importance

36390009a Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
26 Oct 87 p 3

[Article by Werner Christie: "Jan Mayen Has Key Role"]

[Text] Weather forecasting was the justification for the existence of the small Norwegian garrison which clung to Jan Mayen, the windswept volcanic island, during the war. "A low pressure system is developing near Jan

Mayen..." It sounds the same today, and land-based observations on Jan Mayen are still of some importance. However, today satellites are most important. And the strategic significance of this Arctic Ocean island has been increasing.

Recently, a defense exercise took place on Jan Mayen. A rifle platoon with 39 men was flown in. In a crisis and in war such a force will maintain Norway's sovereignty. In addition, the platoon will prepare the destruction and blockage of the airport, and this is perhaps the most important task if things gets serious.

Shortest Way

The Arctic, and thus Jan Mayen have assumed a constantly increasing strategic importance. As is known, the shortest route for the superpower planes and rockets leads over the polar area; in recent years the submarine war under the pack ice has also become a new and frightening possibility. Jan Mayen is not only located along the transit route for the Soviet attack ships which move out into the North Atlantic, but the island is also located in the operational theater of the Soviet Union's submarines which are equipped with intercontinental rockets.

For the fishing fleet Jan Mayen is the only possibility for land-based navigational aids in this inhospitable part of the ocean. Radar kann provide warning and control possibilities in a crisis and in war, and the island is of course important as an unsinkable aircraft carrier. While the runway is currently only 1480 meters long, it can be lengthened and improved.

Canada, which is located between the two superpowers like a buffer state, is in the process of drastically changing its defense policy. The Canadians will strengthen their defense in their Arctic areas, and plan to purchase 10-12 nuclear-powered attack submarines.

The development of special sonar equipment to be used under the ice is also planned. One cannot but admire the unbiased attitude and strength the Canadians display.

What about us here in this country, what about Jan Mayen? First of all, Jan Mayen is part of Norway, but no Svalbard restrictions apply here. To what extent we want to apply our base policy to the island is completely up to us.

In this connection I want to call attention to the fact that our peaceful Danish friends have their own agreement with the United States which makes Greenland a joint Danish-American defense area within NATO, including aircraft bases and large American defense installations on the island.

Defense Installations

Our policy of low tensions will without doubt be a considerable obstacle to defense installations on Jan Mayen. However, low tension does not mean that we and NATO will stay away from this area. Installations on Jan Mayen not only mean striking power in a war situation. At least as important is monitoring in peacetime and in crisis situations. Nothing is more dangerous than if the two superpowers misjudge each other's intentions. Therefore, it is important to be as up to date about the adversary's plans as possible, and this is done, among other things, by monitoring.

Today, a technological development is taking place which is of utmost importance for our security and defense policy, and Jan Mayen has become a key point. Just like the Canadians who should study the new power constellations in our Northern regions without preconceived ideas.

12831

PORTUGAL

Need Seen for Discussion, Preparations for F-16 Transfer

35420019a Lisbon O DIABO in Portuguese
10 Nov 87 pp 5, 10

[Article by Nuno Rogeiro: "Strength of Will As a National Trump Card"]

[Text] The defense of a nationality (and the right to have an independent organized state) does not always take the same form. There is no exact mathematical rule for the preservation of sovereignty, beyond the need to have a national will and a clear strategic determination.

This is, therefore, one of those cases in which the means serve the end, the means merely being tools whose validity and goodness can only be analyzed as a whole.

Tools and Ends

The matter of the F-16s, the Lajes base and our role within NATO are pieces and possible tools in a puzzle which, when completed, will reflect the position of the political regime in Lisbon with regard to the transcendent interests of the Portuguese nation. And in saying nation, if one is to avoid that purposeless discourse nurtured by chauvinist patriots, one must mean people. And historic memory. And intergenerational solidarity, in which the living owe to the work of the dead neither obsession nor content.

None of the items emphasized represent absolute good or bad values. Everything depends on whether they fall within a strategy which strengthens national assertion or one which weakens it. Having the Americans at Lajes is not per se either a disgrace or a cause for joy, despite the

definitive and solemn judgments voiced in one direction or the other by certain radical-chic leftist sectors and some on the right with good bourgeois backgrounds and poor memories.

The Americans in Lajes are good or bad depending on how we are able to adapt our needs and our interests. Some time ago, a former socialist minister made the statement on one of the Enchanted Islands that the discussion between Lisbon and Washington concerning the bases in the Azores should not come down to a self-serving polemic, but should rather involve the construction of an integrated defense system. Now, there is no "integrated defense system" worth anything to us if it is not "self-serving," that is unless it corresponds to what we want, and not to what others believe we should want.

In emphasizing the instrumental value of the international bonds which may commit us in a military and strategic sense, it is important to note the inflated issue of the American military planes in Spain. This is an issue which, some say, has as much to do with us as it does with Madrid.

Lack of Express Will

In this problem, there are questions of three sorts. On the one hand, it is necessary to know what the governments in Madrid and Washington want. On the other hand, it is necessary to know if there is an express will on the American side to approach Portugal, if negotiations with the Spaniards fail completely. Finally, one must know what the official Portuguese position on the question will be if and when the Cavaco Silva government is approached.

To date there has been no formal request from the United States for permission for the fighters in Torrejon to make use of Portuguese territory. However, this does not mean that Washington has not had some idea along this line, applicable to other partners in the Alliance as well. We will see what these are.

For the government in Lisbon to make any official statement on this matter when its aid has not been requested by the interested party would be an untimely and even unrealistic move. Unless the government wants to anticipate what it expects in terms of an American request by announcing a positive or negative response before the fact, in the hope of altering the terms of the request itself.

Basically, the minister of defense said two things. That Portugal has not as yet been consulted concerning the F-16s, which more or less everyone knew, and that if it were approached, it would say "no," about which no one was exactly certain. Or, to be more accurate, Eng Eurico del Melo said that "There is no desire" on the part of the Portuguese authorities to accept the fighter squadrons.

Interpreting the Minister's Statement

Taken literally, this statement says what it seems to, and is an "in limine" rejection of any American request to move the planes to Portuguese territory, whatever the circumstances or the counterpart offer might be.

This would set aside the consent of the government even in the event that the planes were assigned to us under the direct command of IBERLANT, or if they were a part of the Portuguese defense mechanism. Or again, if they were under American command and we were offered a sizable counterpart, such as a speedy correction of the sums allocated for Lajes or the full modernization of our domestic armed forces, or again—cumulatively—aid in the overall civilian development of the country.

However, Eurico del Melo is known for his "realism" and his caution. Would he voice such an absolute judgment even before having received any request? We do not think so. And in such a case, we can interpret his statements in a somewhat modified fashion. If Washington asked for something in connection with the F-16s, it should know of our initial lack of desire, in order to be able to make a sizable compensatory offer, in other words meaning that it is not a question of an absolute negative on the part of the Cavaco Silva government, but rather a possible "No, but..."

The American Desire

This is not, however, a true interpretation, but rather speculation in search of a basis. It is an educated guess, as an American negotiator might say.

Which brings us to the U.S. position. Apart from what is to be found solely in the heads of the negotiators in Madrid, Ambassador Bartholomew, George Shultz and the Pentagon officials, there are public statements concerning the value of the bases and the importance of the bargaining process with the Spaniards.

With regard to the F-16s, there is a symbolic aspect and a practical aspect. The planes under American command represent the solidarity of the peripheral nations with the strategic force of the imperial republic. They are also important in practice, to the extent that they locate American intervention forces near North Africa and the Mediterranean, which might hinder the southward advance of the Soviet forces. The fact is that a confirmed agreement with Madrid might lead in wartime to the strengthening of the American military component (with naval air resources in Rota and tactical and strategic bombers in Torrejon).

Rozanne Ridway, Alton Keel and Weinberger himself have already said in the very recent past that Spain is the best location for basing the planes from the strategic point of view. But if this proves unworkable, there are alternatives which are being studied. These studies have been announced piecemeal, in an effort to influence the

Spanish decision. It is known, for example, that Madrid would not view the transfer of the fighter planes to Portugal with much favor unless Spain were to receive compensation on the level of the NATO commands.

Portugal might be among the possible alternatives, particularly if the other possibilities were to be excluded. Turkey remains a neighbor of the USSR, and this is an era of detente; Morocco is politically unpredictable; the FRG is a great distance from the south; Italy is already overloaded with American installations, and lacks the political desire to have more.

What About Portugal?

The transfer of these military resources to our territory would give us a different global projection. It would, however, have its costs. The growth of a foreign population in an area which is socially rather unstable is not the least of these, while the greatest might be the permanent establishment of a non-Portuguese operational force on the continent which is not a part of the domestic chain of command nor, immediately, the NATO command.

However, there might be alternative modes. And these should be discussed on a casuistic basis by Portugal, with vigor and intelligence. There will be time for this. Let us hope that there will be the will.

5157

Operational Details on 'Jupiter-87' Air Maneuvers Provided

35420019b Lisbon O DIA in Portuguese
3 Nov 87 pp 12-13

[Article by Manuel Catarino: "The Jupiter-87: War in Peacetime"]

[Text] The Jupiter-87 military exercise has ended. For a week, major Air Force and parachute troop resources engaged in a violent "war." This war would be, as all of them are, grim in terms of the commitment made, and also a game, because it was planned and invented, but it was in fact painful. Every aspect was present, as if it were a real war, except for death.

The entire exercise took place in a theater of conventional conflict, with the possibility of a nuclear clash, for which our possible defenses are practically nil, set aside. This was an exercise, and a very difficult one, as we had occasion to observe.

The Jupiter-87 military exercise, planned and carried out by the Operational Command of the Air Force and Parachute Troop Corps, ended yesterday. The activities involved about 2,000 men, and substantial air and paratroop forces were mobilized. During the exercise, use was made of the whole of our national airspace, as well as the international area over the maritime waters extending to a point 200 miles off our coast, where the

air resources involved were concerned. The parachute troops, for their part, operated in the Alter do Chao (Portalegre, Alegrete, Arronches, Monforte, Avis, Ponte de Sor) and Idanha-a-Nova (Monfortinho, Salvaterra do Extremo, Segura, Zebreira) areas.

Jupiter-87 represented the culmination of a year of training and other activities, during which an effort was made to drill the command forces and to place a large parachute unit—the Light Paratroopers Brigade (Bri-paras) on the ground, and to test ground-air cooperation as well as the process of mobilizing the personnel called up. Basically, it was a question of planning, coordinating and conducting air and ground operations within a conventional war scenario, in order to perfect the efficiency of the command and the forces, with several goals in mind: to drill the Air Force in transition from a peacetime situation to a war scenario; to perfect the tactical and technical training of the operational command units of the Air Force and the Parachute Troop Corps; to drill, test and evaluate operational procedures, communications and electronic war systems, as well as the execution of antitank warfare and special operations; and to test and evaluate the speed and efficiency of the commands and the forces and the operational logistical support bodies (ground and airborne), including points of support where no adequate infrastructures exist.

The War Scenario

To set the scene for this grim peacetime war, two nations, Democrita and Utopia, were invented. The former, located between Sul do Tejo and Algarve and including a strip of Spanish territory, had close relations with the countries in the Blue Alliance. Utopia, a country allied with the Orange Bloc, was for its part located to the south and west of Democrita, in the Algarve region, and included a part of Spain.

These, then, were two nations with an extensive common frontier, although it was not a natural boundary. Its exact location had been traditionally challenged by Utopia, for which reason the relations between the two nations had been characterized by constant tension.

Since the beginning of this decade, both the deterioration of the world economic situation and the successive failures of negotiations concerning armaments control, along with the measures to ensure safety and confidence between the Blue Alliance and the Orange Bloc, had served to revive a regional crisis. And now, within this context, Utopia had become more insistent in its territorial demands, which had even resulted in frontier skirmishes.

Early in October, Utopia and the other countries in the Orange Bloc began large-scale exercises along the boundary with Democrita, which fact, naturally, sharply exacerbated the relations between the two nations. From that to military attack was but a step. Ignoring the joint efforts of various nations, those in the Blue Alliance in

particular, to find a solution to the crisis, Utopia, with the support of the forces in the Orange Bloc which participated in the exercise, invaded Democritan territory.

Finding itself the victim of aggression, Democrita turned for military support to the friendly neighboring countries belonging to the Blue Alliance. They then decided to enter the conflict. They attempted to help Democrita repel the invading forces and thus to reconfirm the frontiers established by virtue of international agreements.

Although hindered by the Democritan forces, the Utopian military made progress on the ground and occupied two of the most important Democritan cities, as well as the international airports serving them. However, at the end of October, the Blue forces succeeded in blocking the advance of the invaders, who were halted along the line defined by the Campainhas River and Dam. In view of this defensive effort by the nation under attack, Utopia proceeded to concentrate its forces, making it appear that it was planning to launch a new offensive.

The deployment of the invading Orange Bloc forces on the ground suggested that the target of the offensive might be major ports, one of them involving a petrochemical complex, and the other, the capital of Democrita.

A military evaluation of the strength of the invading forces showed them to be capable of projecting their air power in depth into the territory of Democrita, using the international airports occupied in the country as a base. On the other hand, the invaders had the relative naval capacity to block the maritime transport routes serving ports of strategic economic importance to Democrita.

The last factor involved was that the population of Democrita was hostile to the invading forces of the Orange Bloc.

Operational Phases

The Jupiter-87 exercise, coordinated by Brig Gen Francois Martins, the commander of the Parachute Troop Corps, where the ground forces were concerned, and by Brigadier General Alvarenga, for all of the Air Force units involved, developed through three military operational phases.

Initially, the task of securing the Alter do Chao railroad junction was assigned to the Light Paratroop Brigade commanded by Col Mira Vaz, with the specific task of guaranteeing control of it, since the invading forces could be expected to take it for themselves by means of sabotage.

In a second phase, the Light Brigade was assigned the mission of controlling a pocket infiltrated by the invaders beyond the position of the Blue Alliance forces in the Portalegre region.

However, the force dispatched was unable to gain control of the situation. As a result it was ordered to withdraw, and to undertake the defensive occupation of the Seda river-bank zone. There the Light Paratroop Brigade awaited reinforcement by the reserve 1981-82 company.

The combat between the clashing forces involved about 780 men, on both sides. They were parachute troops especially trained for military actions within the context of a conventional war.

On Wednesday, as a natural consequence of the operations undertaken by the forces of the Blue Alliance, C-130 transport planes dropped about 540 parachute troopers in the Alter do Chao region, along with two heavy mortar companies in Aveiro, and an antitank company in Monsanto. Once on the ground, the combat groups were transported to their strategic positions. The heavy equipment would be towed overland or transported by helicopter. In these operations, both Puma and Alouette aircraft were used.

The major operation launched on Wednesday had been planned for the preceding day. However, the poor weather conditions which developed led to its cancellation. In fact, as early as 4 am on Wednesday morning, the planners at the launching site were studying the weather to determine whether conditions were safe enough for jumping. However, the wind was blowing at 7 or 8 meters per second, with gusts sometimes exceeding 16. Conditions were not right for the launching. The safe limit is up to 6 or 7 meters per second, with only infrequent gusts not exceeding 12.

There was no reason to risk a relatively large number of broken legs, for this war, after all, was only an exercise. However, if the war had been a real one, the paratroopers would have jumped given those wind conditions, and even much worse ones. If the operation had justified the risks. In this case, the number of casualties among the men could be calculated with a certain accuracy, based on the jumping conditions.

During Jupiter-87, the Monte Real Air Base was the target of a violent air attack on Friday, wherein, naturally, both the attack conditions and the resulting defense actions were tested. Moreover, there was a simulated attack by a Dutch naval squadron passing through Portuguese waters from the north.

On the following day, the 9th, a number of real firing tests were carried out in Alcochete.

Participating Forces

The air units participating as a part of the Blue Alliance forces included G-91, A7-P, C-130, C-2122 and FTB 337-G airplanes, and Alouette III and SA 330 Puma helicopters. The invading forces had A7-P and C-212 airplanes and Alouette III helicopters.

The parachute troop units involved included the Third Airborne Division of the First Blue Army, represented by the Light Paratroop Brigade, with a command and general staff, the 21st and 22nd Paratroop Battalions, a ground-to-air operational group, operational support group and services, a heavy mortar company, a communications company and a reserve paratroop company. The parachute forces of the Orange Bloc had a battalion, represented by a company.

5157

Military Officer Laments Lack of Air Force Resources

35420019c Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS
in Portuguese 1 Nov 87 p 4

[Excerpt] Gen Brochado de Miranda made the statement in Portalegre that the Air Force lacks the technical and human resources for the execution of the various missions assigned it.

The chief of the Air Force General Staff made this statement in Alter Pedroso during a visit he paid to the tactical base in connection with the Jupiter-87 military exercise, which ends tomorrow.

Although bad weather conditions caused the cancellation of some of the exercises planned during this operation, Gen Brochado de Miranda expressed satisfaction with the morale of the troops, which, in his view, "responded to the challenge."

Brochado de Miranda expressed regret concerning the limited resources available to the Air Force, but he added that his general staff intends to add two Interceptor squadrons (between 40 and 50 planes), based on the counterpart payment expected from the United States for the use of the Lajes Air Base.

The general and chief of the EMFA further added that the Aviocars will have the most sophisticated equipment, making it possible to detect the penetration of the exclusive economic zone of the Portuguese state by foreign aircraft more easily.

5157

SPAIN

Civilian Reportedly To Assume CESID Leadership

35480026 Madrid CAMBIO 16 in Spanish
26 Oct 87 pp 20-21

[Article by Rafael Cid: "A Civilian for CESID"]

[Text] According to information gathered by our magazine from governmental sources, Enrique Ballester Gallego, a Spaniard born and educated in Algeria and the PSOE delegate in this African country, is the most probable candidate for the top position in the Higher Defense Intelligence Center (CESID) the military intelligence service. This appointment would break a long tradition in the leadership of the Spanish military intelligence. From the time it was established, 10 years ago, the CESID has been uninterruptedly led by a military officer. At this time, its director is Gen Emilio Alonso Manglano.

The replacement of the uniformed Manglano by the civilian Ballester means, among other things, the implementation of the Socialist Party's program announced in 1982, which aimed at placing non-military officials in leadership positions in those institutions which are not strictly military, but play a part in national security. This "civilian turn" was initiated after the general elections in July 1986 which returned the socialists to power. The influential Guardia Civil [Civil Guard] was the first to have a civilian, Luis Roldan, as director. Later, the former civil governor of Madrid, Jose Maria Rodriguez Colorado took over the general directorate of the police.

Nevertheless, the prospect that Enrique Ballester may become the head of the Spanish CIA is viewed as a genuine revolution in circles which are directly or indirectly related to security and defense affairs. An official of the intelligence services told CAMBIO 16 that "if this came to pass, it would be appropriate to start saying that in Spain, the civilian power has recovered all the reins."

It was this same democratic spirit that imbued the criticism made by the PSOE in 1979 through one of its principal experts in security issues, former Commandant Julio Busquets, who said, after being apprised of the appointment of Gen Gerardo Marinas as head of the CESID: "This service should not be a military institution, but a civilian one, or at least a mixed organ, as in other European countries." The socialist deputy continued: "Consequently, its head should be a politician with a great overall vision, high ethical sense and a proven love for democracy."

However, it is not only this normalization at the top of the CESID that upsets military and political circles. It is rather the rotund personality of Ballester the candidate that is making the largest impact. Enrique Ballester is viewed as an "alchemist of conflicts."

A former colleague of Ballester's affirmed to our magazine: "He is an extremely able businessman who can come forth triumphant from the most embarrassing situations. He is a pearl."

A personal friend of Felipe Gonzalez and Alfonso Guerra, Ballester is a personality well known among the then young socialists working clandestinely under the Franco regime. Thanks to him and to his excellent relations with the Algerian leader, Chadli Benjedid, as well as with the historical cadre of the Algerian National Liberation Front, the North African capital was used as a basis of support for the socialists of the seventies. Ballester was also the decisive factor in the decision by the Algerian authorities to close down the broadcasting station of Antonio Cubillo, the partisan of Canarian independence, who, from the other side of the Mediterranean, was fighting on his own, thus creating difficulties for the UCD [Democratic Center Union] government.

It is precisely because of this curriculum that Ballester believes that his name will probably not be mentioned for the CESID leadership, even though he would not reject such an eventuality. "Man, if you would tell me that they are thinking of me as ambassador to Algeria, I would not say no," he stated to CAMBIO 16. "At any rate, if the government orders me to deal with the issue, I would only propose that the appointment be for a specific length of time. When all is said and done, the one field I really know well is business."

A knowledge that, nevertheless, does not prevent Ballester from having some ideas on what a modern intelligence service should be (his father, a civilian, worked for the General Staff until he died last September). "My vision of intelligence is certainly closer to that of some gentlemen who can foresee the fluctuations of the dollar than to that of people who spend their lives scrutinizing the activities of a terrorist group."

The possibility that some involutionist circles may attempt to defeat his possible appointment by citing his activity as a "red millionaire" does not trouble his sleep. As the principal shareholder of the Coming firm, Ballester has transacted deals with Algeria worth 16 billion pesetas; moreover, his relations with Castro's Cuba, where a luxury tourist complex is being built in Cayo Largo, are excellent. "Look, if someone attempts to get at me, he should think better of it. I have friends and relations all over the world. I have been traveling for many years. In Algeria, in Cuba..., but also in capitalist countries like the FRG and the United States." Having said that, he proceeds to a revelation.

"These vilifiers dealing in theories should also know—so that my file is complete—that I was the mediator between the United States and Algeria to obtain the release of the American hostages in Tehran. The State Department was looking for a country that could succeed

with Khomeyni. And thanks to the Algerians, who did not set any conditions to Reagan, the President was able to bring the hostages home."

Why is the name of a civilian being mentioned now to head the largest and most powerful intelligence service? It seems that the replacement affair started because of the CESID's theoretically poor results in recent years, in spite of the fact it possesses more resources than any other intelligence service (approximately 5 billion pesetas for next year's budget, plus total personnel numbering about 2,000).

However, there are contrasting versions as explanations for this supposed "failure." CESID sources point to the socialist government as bearing the principal responsibility: "Moncloa does not wish us to move," a member of the military intelligence service stated. "They do not want to upset the apple cart." On the opposite side, the police "spies" believe that the roots of passivity must be sought in the fatal break-off of a relationship of dependence. "Until some time ago," a police official says, "they acted on the information provided to them by the CIA in matters of terrorism or of the Soviets. However, since the time when the Americans stopped doing this as reprisals for the bases situation, they are short of resources."

According to Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior sources, it is not strange, in a situation of this type, that the government seems deposed to have the CESID as well affected by the "reconversion" ahead of the timetable that had been agreed upon. Originally, Gen Manglano's replacement was set for the time when the new headquarters—on the road to La Coruna in the Madrid suburbs—endowed with an electronic infrastructure that would be quite comparable to the CIA in Langley would become fully operational.

In circles close to Spanish intelligence, it is affirmed that the "president's men" note with distaste the fact that the CESID men are mentioned in the press more because of some queer scandals such as the arrest of an official for selling information to a magazine rather than for their merits as the centurions of the state.

These circles feel strongly that maximum efficiency should be achieved with a minimum of cost, indeed, that the essence of the Chinese proverb be recaptured for espionage purposes: to demand the cleanest of men for the dirtiest of jobs.

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Helicopter Purchase for Rapid Deployment Force *35480030 Madrid YA in Spanish 2 Nov 87 p 2*

[Article by Fernando Rueda]

[Text] Madrid—The Special Rapid Deployment Force will be getting the latest assault helicopters, like the ones that the United States used in Vietnam. They will enable

it to respond quickly and powerfully against any country that attacks Spanish territory, reliable sources have told this paper. The move is in keeping with the new approach that Lt Gen Miguel Iniguez del Moral, the army chief of staff, implemented a few months ago; it calls for obtaining smaller units with the capacity for rapid response.

The army has decided to request that the Assault Helicopter Battalion (BHELA) be included in the Special Rapid Deployment Force, the plans for which the Defense Ministry is preparing. YA has learned from reliable sources.

The arguments for its inclusion are based on the fact that the future most powerful division of our Armed Forces will need units that can rapidly attack enemy targets and withdraw as quickly as possible, in the style of the American cavalry during the Vietnam war, as millions of moviegoers saw in the film "Apocalypse Now."

As in the movie, the idea is for the army to have both tanks, which are heavier and slower but irreplaceable because of their effectiveness, and self-propelled units that can attack specific enemy-controlled zones and support their own infantry groups that are unable to overrun a zone controlled by the aggressor. Moreover, one of their main missions and the one towards which the most effort and training are being geared, is antitank activity, for which the helicopters are outfitted with the latest "Hot" missile systems.

Until today, in fact, several BHELA units have been taking part in a combined Spanish-French exercise in France in which paratrooper units and helicopters from the two countries conducted various defensive operations against an imaginary aggressor coming from northern Europe. During this exercise the Spanish assault helicopters demonstrated their high level of preparedness and their ability to confront a potential adversary.

Operational Problems

According to army sources, the restructuring of the army, which its chief of staff, Lt Gen Miguel Iniguez del Moral, is successfully culminating, has caused operational problems in some units, "but little by little we are managing not only to equal the previous level of response capacity but to exceed it by a wide margin."

The Defense Ministry, however, does not have the same view of the army's usefulness. High-level ministry sources have told this paper that at present and in consideration of Spain's involvement in a joint Western defense force, land forces are much less valuable than the navy or air force.

They use this argument to justify the enormous investments in hardware for these two branches and the ongoing delays in procuring apparently basic materiel for the army, such as tanks. "Within Spain's approach to

defense," add the sources close to Defense Minister Narcis Serra, "there are other priorities that come before the acquisition of tanks, which are less and less useful in Spain."

The opinion of these sources concerning the assault helicopters coincides with the importance that the army attaches to them. They feel that the army's future lies in having much smaller but more effective and better armed units. They believe that its importance and deterrent value will depend on its ability to respond rapidly to any attack, and to achieve this they have created the Special Rapid Deployment Force.

The Assault Helicopter Battalion, which is stationed outside Almagro, was created in 1979 in response to the need for rapid antitank units, which the Western nations had detected and even used in recent wars.

Spain has BO-105 helicopters, which are manufactured by the German firm MBB and have a 3-hour flight time carrying a pilot, copilot and a flight mechanic. In emergencies they can reach almost 200 kilometers an hour. They carry six "Hot" missiles and besides attacking tanks, are very useful on observation and armed reconnaissance missions.

The army also has other combat models, which have proved their worth during the tough Vietnam and Korean wars. These models are the HR-12, the HU-8 and the HU-10. This past 16 October at its Almagro base the unit commemorated its first 25,000 hours of battalion flight time, during which it has suffered not a single casualty in spite of the dangerous action it sees.

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TURKEY

Law Combines Military Support Foundations

35540004a Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish
29 Sep 87 pp 1, 10

[Report by Erdal Saglam]

[Text] Ankara—With the implementation of the privatization plan under way, the Ozal government is now working to "civilianize" the finances of the military sector. Despite strong opposition from the military sector, the Ozal government has succeeded, with the approval of President Kenan Evren, to merge the three foundations for the strengthening of the land, air and naval forces into the newly established "Foundation to Strengthen the Turkish Armed Forces." The law which ends the corporate status of the military foundations and transfers their assets to the new foundation went into effect on 25 September 1987 thus placing a resource of nearly 170 billion Turkish lira at the disposal of civilian governments.

The law establishing the Foundation to Strengthen the Turkish Armed Forces and liquidating the other foundations cites as the founders of the new foundation: the Minister of National Defense, the Undersecretary of the Ministry of National Defense, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff and the Chairman of the Administration for the Development and Support of the Defense Industry. Sources from the Office of the General Staff stated that although the "two-soldier-two-civilian" balance has nominally been preserved, the government is working to make the Undersecretary of the Ministry of National Defense a civilian and that the new foundation is expected to operate under the control of the government.

With the consolidation of the assets of the military foundation in a single foundation, the shares and partnership rights of these foundations in various firms—amounting to 41.8 billion Turkish lira—have been transferred to the new foundation. While the new foundation is supposed to coordinate its work with the Defense Industry Development and Support Administration, the new arrangement reportedly "means a curtailment of the military's influence in industry."

Now that the three military foundations have been merged into one in accordance with the law, the founders of the Foundation to Strengthen the Turkish Armed Forces are expected to meet in the coming days to put the new foundation into operation and to appoint its staff. Prominent individuals from the private sector have reportedly declared their candidacy to head the new foundation. One of these prospective candidates is said to be Sakip Sabanci, a former executive council chairman of the Foundation to Strengthen the Naval Forces. It is reported that Sabanci has initiated efforts in the Ministry of National Defense to have himself appointed as the chairman of the executive council of the new foundation.

Meanwhile, the consolidation of all the military foundations into a single foundation despite strong opposition from the military sector and the administrators of the military foundations has led to different interpretations. According to the government and one segment of the armed forces, a single foundation will meet the needs of the Turkish Armed Forces more easily and efficiently and will help to eliminate rumors about irregularities and corruption in various military foundations. In contrast to this view, advanced primarily by government officials, most armed forces officials claim that the new system leaves all authority and control in the hands of the government.

The objective of the Foundation to Strengthen the Turkish Armed Forces is summarized as "contributing to the enhancement of the combat capability of the Turkish Armed Forces through the development of our national war industry, the establishment of new war industry branches and the purchase of war weaponry and equipment." According to the law which establishes the new foundation, which ends the legal status of all other

military foundations and which transfers all their assets to the new foundation, no other foundations can be established for this purpose in the future.

The three former military foundations entered into partnerships in industry with the significant amount of donations they collected during the Cyprus Peace Operation and have played a major role in Turkish industry for the last 10 years. The assets of the three foundations transferred to the new foundation total about 170 billion Turkish lira. The three foundations whose corporate status was repealed last week played a leading role in the formation of new firms geared for military production and provided financing to existing factories by becoming partners in them. Personnel working for the three former foundations will be terminated after receiving their earned severance pay.

An examination of the balance sheets of the three former military foundations indicates that the foundation with the largest assets was the Foundation to Strengthen the Turkish Air Forces. This foundation pioneered the establishment of and was a major partner in TUSAS [Turkish Aircraft Industry Corporation], the TUSAS Aerospace Industry Corporation, the TUSAS Motor Industry Corporation and Havelsan. It was also a partner in Aselsan and Petlas. The foundation had assets of 133 billion Turkish lira. As of 31 December 1986, the Foundation to Strengthen the Turkish Air Forces had 53.2 billion Turkish lira deposited in banks, 5.7 billion Turkish lira in its securities portfolio, 702 million Turkish lira in fixed assets and 44 billion Turkish lira in accounts receivable and 28.4 billion Turkish lira in partnership holdings.

The Foundation to Strengthen the Turkish Land Forces, which was established with the flood of donations in 1974, had assets totaling 22 billion Turkish lira as of the end of 1986. This foundation, which played a leading role in the establishment of Aselsan, was a partner in Aspiisan Military Battery Industry, Otomarsan, Koytas, Sidas and Havelsan. As of 31 December 1986, this foundation had 6 billion Turkish lira in bank deposits, 24.5 million Turkish lira invested in securities, 1.5 billion Turkish lira in reserve accounts, 1 billion Turkish lira in fixed assets and 12 billion Turkish lira in partnership holdings.

The Naval Society which was first established in 1909 under the name "National Society to Support the Imperial Navy" was transformed into the Turkish Naval Foundation in 1972 and was renamed "Foundation to Strengthen the Turkish Naval Forces" in 1981. The foundation held shares in Ditas, Aselsan, NETAS [Northern Electric Telecommunications Corporation], TTE [Turkish Telecommunication Industry Corporation] and TESTAS [Turkish Electronic Industry and Trade Corporation], and its assets totaled 12.7 billion Turkish lira as of the end of 1986. As of 31 December 1986, the foundation had 7.6 billion Turkish lira in bank

accounts, 5.5 billion Turkish lira in securities, 397.9 million Turkish lira in fixed assets and 3.1 billion Turkish lira in partnership holdings.

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Pirinclik Military Facility Described
35540004b Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish
29 Sep 87 pp 2, 10

[Report by Aydin Ozdalga]

[Text] We entered "Pirinclik," one of the United States' most important intelligence gathering facilities in the world. This facility, which monitors Soviet facilities where ICBMs are built and tested is of vital importance to the United States. The importance of this facility will increase even more once the work on the elimination of intermediate-range nuclear missiles is completed.

Joint Defense Installation

Established in 1953, the Pirinclik facility is adjacent to the village of Pirinclik, 25 kilometers from Diyarbakir. Built in accordance with a secret military accord signed between Turkey and the United States in 1952, the facility is officially a "Turkish-American Joint Defense Installation."

Intelligence gathering activities in the facility are carried out through two primary antennas. The first of these antennas is a fixed structure which resembles a wire-mesh fence with a width of 50 meters and a height of 60 meters. The other one is a dish antenna, popularly known as a satellite antenna, with a diameter of 20 meters.

These two antennas continually scan the skies and transmit the electronic intelligence they gather to the communications center. The data is decoded and evaluated there and is shared by Turkey and the United States. Turkish and American personnel work together in this center.

Soviet Nuclear Missiles

What do the giant antennas at Pirinclik monitor? According to bilateral agreements, this is a "radar warning and space monitoring station." But the primary function of this facility is to monitor the nuclear missile activities in the Soviet Union.

Radars in this facility monitor all activities in the nuclear missile centers in the cities of "Kasputin" and "Turatam" in the Soviet Union. In these two centers intercontinental-range nuclear missiles are built and tested. The SS-class missiles with ranges of up to 10,000 kilometers that are developed here cause nightmares to the Western world.

The importance of the Pirinlik facility increased even more with the latest developments. With the elimination of the intermediate range nuclear missiles in sight, attention is now turning to the intercontinental missiles. These missiles are most easily monitored from the "Pirinlik Turkish-American Joint Defense Installation."

The Turkish commander of the Pirinlik facility, Air Force Lt Col Engin Hayreter, answered our questions about the facility.

Question: What is the contribution of the Pirinlik facility to Turkey's defense?

Answer: Thanks to this facility and through cooperation with the United States, Turkey is able to obtain information it could not have obtained otherwise.

Question: Does Turkey share all the information gathered by this facility?

Answer: Of course. In the communications center where all electronic intelligence is decoded and evaluated Turkish personnel serve together with American personnel. Consequently, hiding some information from Turkey is out of the question.

Question: Some circles characterize such facilities as "American bases." There are some who claim that "in these facilities there are areas where even Turkish commanders cannot enter." Are there any areas in Pirinlik where you cannot enter?

Answer: That is a false and baseless allegation. There is nowhere I cannot enter in this facility. The only exception is the Americans' cryptographic center. This is where they encrypt their secret communications with their bases. In other words, this is private communication just like letters and telephone calls. I could not be expected to enter that center.

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